Chapter
Five
Hamas
and the Future
Hamas
Approaches to Peace Initiatives.
At the time that
Hamas was launched in December 1987 the Palestinian arena was afflicted
by a certain degree of paralysis: Arab governments had demoted the Question
of Palestine; the Palestinian movement was too weak to act on ridding
the Palestinian people of their problems and the International community
was silent as the ongoing victimization of Palestinians in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip continued.
Though the intifada
primarily came as a response to the oppressive measures by the occupation
authorities. Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, by and large, were
disenchanted with the inability of their representatives, their Arab brethren
and the seeming indifference of the outside world in contributing to the
resolution of their dilemma.
Hamas obviously
evolved in the midst of such conflicting postures on the one hand to capture
the momentum by addressing Palestinian grievances, and on the other to
posit new modes of thinking for managing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The greater the
level of tensions between the two main protagonists, Palestinians and
Israelis, during the intifada the more interested the outside world became
in introducing schemes for resolving the conflict, particularly the United
States. The more determined Palestinians in the Occupied Territories seemed
to be in counteracting Israeli measures, the more concerned the United
States became about the spillover effect of the intifada to the Arab region,
hence peace proposals and initiatives were lodged in an attempt to neutralize
the levels of tension and with the hope of providing an atmosphere of
stability in an area where it was badly lacking.
Almost one year
after the intifada broke out, the PLO issued a Declaration of Independence
for the state of Palestine in November 1988 while none of Palestine was
free from the grip of occupation. Feelings of exhilaration proliferated
throughout the Occupied Territories in response to the Declaration of
Independence, accompanied, however, by vibrant underpinnings of dissatisfaction
and disbelief. The people were in need of any glimpse of hope that the
conditions of their lives would change thus were inspired by that far
reaching measure by the PLO. The newly evolving movement Hamas, however,
took the PLO's tendency towards peaceful co-existence with Israel as the
very ingredient which would help advance its cause. Through its intifada
leaflets and other pronouncements, Hamas urged Palestinian public opinion
to be armed with caution so that its hopes and expectations would not
be dashed when it became clear that the Declaration of Independence was
incapable of changing facts on the ground.
While the Unified
National Leadership of the Uprising was in concert with the policies of
the PLO, Hamas exploited every opportunity to highlight the deficiencies
of any path for resolving the conflict other than its path, the path of
Islam. Hamas opposition to PLO policies was centered on the assumption
that no peace, therefore no co-existence can be hoped for with "the
enemy" Israel.
The Declaration
of Independence for the state of Palestine continued to remain no more
than a historical document and the hope of Palestinians for change due
to its issuance continued to be gradually shattered; no state was established
and no tendency towards co-existence materialized as the intifada continued
in full force with more Palestinians getting killed and injured.
The Gulf crisis
and hence the Gulf war broke out, serving as yet another reminder that
the Palestinian problem was not the highest item on the agenda of the
International community, the more paralysis, the more despair and the
wider the distance between hope and reality the easier it became for Hamas
to formulate its ideology in opposition to any proposed political settlement.
Hamas' formula was that no honorable and just peace could be established
from a position of weakness with "the enemy". As a result of
the Gulf war rampant tensions began to spread once again throughout the
Arab world especially as Iraq was defeated.
To contain the
new wave of tensions in the region the US called for the convening of
the Madrid conference in October 1991, just a few months after it achieved
its victory over Iraq. Palestinians and Israelis were invited to participate
and as a result a new phase of expectation building in Palestinian Society
emerged. Hamas had already, and in no uncertain terms, outlined its attitude
to such conferences in its covenant of 1988 part of which read:
The initiatives
conflict, what are called "Peaceful Solutions" and "International
Conferences" to solve the Palestinian problem. As far as the ideology
of the Islamic Resistance Movement is concerned, giving up any part of
Palestine is like giving up part of its religion.
From time to
time the invitation is made for an international conference to look into
solving the problem. Some accept and some reject the idea, for one reason
or another,asking for some condition or conditions to be fulfilled in
order to agree to attend and participate in the conference. Due to the
Islamic Resistance Movement's knowledge of the participating parties of
the conference and the participants' past and present opinions and stands
on Muslim interests, the Islamic Resistance Movement does not perceive
that the conferences are able to deliver the demands, provide the rights,nor
do justice to the oppressed. Those conferences are nothing but a form
of enforcing the rule of the unbelievers in the land of Muslims. And when
have the unbelievers justly treated the believers?
[124]
There too, however,
Hamas tried make itself a beneficiary: after numerous rounds of talks
their opposition to the negotiations was validated by the average Palestinian,
as the conflict continued unabated and seemingly irresolvable. There too,
however, Hamas tried make itself a beneficiary: after numerous rounds
of talks their opposition to the negotiations was validated by the average
Palestinian, as the conflict continued unabated and seemingly irresolvable.
The more complicated
the mission before Palestinian participants in the talks seemed to be
the wider the base of Hamas opposition. After the PLO and Israel signed
the September 1993 Declaration of Principles in Washington DC, following
the secret Oslo talks, another wave of shattered expectations characterized
Palestinian society. For Hamas the Declaration of Principles was the climax
of the launch of its opposition to evolving peace initiatives and arrangements.
The cornerstone
of Hamas' existence is its declared discontent with the status quo. In
articulating its message, its opposition to peace initiatives can be pinpointed
in three different yet related dimensions: first, it inherently opposes
any agreements with Israel which would allow the latter to live on the
soil of historic Palestine.
"In the
circle of struggle with world Zionism, the Islamic Resistance Movement
considers itself the spearhead, or a step on the path;"
[125]
Therefore, any
peace with Israel is unacceptable since in Hamas' view, "The Zionist
invasion is a vicious attack that does not have piety not to use all methods
low and despicable to fulfill its obligations;"
[126]
According to
Hamas which "works towards raising the banner of Allah on every inch
of Palestine."
[127]
there is little point in pursuing peace with Israel.
This line of
thinking suggests that any agreement with Israel is wrong for it is unachievable
and harmful.
The second dimension
of Hamas' opposition to peace initiatives can be found in its conception
of the United States as the power championing such arrangements. The US
is a strong ally of Israel, it is the leader of the Western world and
it is there were the "imperialistic powers in the Capitalist West..support
the enemy with all their might - material and human"
[128]
Thirdly, Hamas
opposes the peace talks as a function of its intrinsic competition with
the PLO. To Hamas, the PLO is inept and too weak to pursue a peace process
which would generate a positive result for the people. Sheikh Hamad Bitawi
expressed his distaste for the Peace process in the following terms:
Some people might
think that the Peace Process will lead to an improvement of the economic
situation, which is possible, but overall this process will do more harm
than good.
[129]
Bitawi understands
the rationale for PLO participation in the talks:
The PLO is now
going through a difficult phase, a torn Arab world and a Western world
against it.
[130]
Yet, his understanding
does not sufficiently justify the PLO involvement in the current peace
process:
We understand
their position but this cannot be justification, this means that if I
cannot liberate the whole homeland I must not sign or give up any part
of it.
[131]
To give credence
to Hamas opposition to the peace talks Bitawi goes on to stress that:
...not only the
Islamic movement opposes this accord but even from within Fateh, in the
PNC and other places there is opposition. Even in Israel today more than
45% of the people don't support the accord.
[132]
Bitawi further
tries to legitimize Hamas' opposition to the PLO by stating that:
The brothers
in the PLO should not be anxious because of this opposition as it has
been evidenced to them not only in words but in practical terms that this
opposition has been positive. Had there been no opposition it would have
been the duty of the PLO to found one in order to help boost its position.
[133]
Hamas opposition
to the peace talks notwithstanding, Hamad Bitawi, at the time of his expulsion
had this to say on the nature and conduct of the talks:
It is not that
we are against peace; the peace we want is a just and honorable one. We
don't feel that the process unfolding now is in favor of the Palestinian
people. It means to Zionize the Palestinian problem and the Arab nation
as well as the Islamic world. This process will not bring Palestine back
to us. The expulsion [of alleged Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists] was
meant to silence the voice of opposition to the current peace process.
[134]
In September
1993 the position of Jamil Hamameh regarding the peace process and the
future in general after the Declaration of Principles was elucidated thus:
Hamas has defined
its position without ambiguity, it strongly opposes the talks that are
going on in Washington. It also opposes secret as well as public agreements
that are taking place with the Jewish state especially what has come to
be known as the Gaza - Jericho first option. This is the type of decision
that we consider to be the straw that broke the camel's back. It is the
straw which has revealed the true picture of [leadership] acquiescence
to what is called a solution. We consider this to be a great historic
act of treason and a dangerous one which will begin the dissolution of
this leadership which has sold the struggle, sold the blood and sold the
rights of the Palestinian people.
[135]
When questioned
more specifically on the PLO and Arafat himself and the whole dynamics
of the process, Hamameh was again critical of Arafat saying that what
had happened was no more than "an attempt by the leadership in the
PLO to get out of its trouble." He went on to talk about the divisions
within all Palestinian factions and among the people, which, to him signified
that there was "no national decision, no political decision."
Bitawi also replied
in more detail when questioned on his views about the Declaration of Principles
and what would be the result of it:
The accord with
all its negative features means that the peace process is an extension
of the occupation and is meant to further serve the occupation. The Israeli
army will not withdraw from the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. The talks
are about redeployment or redefinition of their control of our homeland.
The other thing which is central is the problem of Jerusalem. and of al-Aksa
mosque which is absent from the whole process.
[136]
He went on to
discuss Jerusalem more specifically as he said he had done with the Israeli
Military Governor of Nablus:
We will never
accept for Jerusalem to be under your [Israeli] control and if the Palestinian
people were to accept that it will then this problem will remain of great
concern to the whole Islamic nation. I will never accept that if I want
to pray at al-Aqsa then I need to get a permit. If there is one individual
believer who remains alive, to have Jerusalem and al-Aqsa remain under
occupation will never be allowed.
[137]
The concern that
`weakness' will cause concession from the Palestinians is of major importance
to Bitawi and a theme which recurred throughout the interview. Indeed
he seems to imply that it is weakness alone and no other reason for the
PLO to be taking its current course. During the same conversation with
the Israeli Military Governor, Bitawi recounted that he said the following:
Now you are the
stronger and we are the weak but the strong do not remain strong and the
weak do not remain weak. There have been great powers like the Soviet
Union which collapse. The United States is ready to collapse within less
than ten years. What will become of Israel when the United States collapses?
What will become of the Arab regimes who are in line with Western interests
including the submissive PLO? We are utterly confident that there will
be changes.
[138]
Although Bitawi
does accept that the peace process will continue on its course of "normalization,
then recognition of and peace with Israel" he raises his concern
that the PLO would conspire against the Islamic trend:
We know that
Palestine will become a bridge for Israel to penetrate the Arab world
economically, politically and culturally and we worry that one of the
secret provisions [of the talks] is that the PLO have accepted to be a
tool of oppression against the Islamic current as is now the case in Tunis,
Algeria, Egypt and throughout the world. We don't rule that out unfortunately,
but we continue to hope that they will be wise enough to avert a crisis
among the people.
[139]
Hamas' stand
vis-a-vis the peace process led one critic to question whether Hamas is
actually against the talks or whether its goal is to primarily establish
a solid popular base for itself:
Hamas is not
against the talks per se; it aims to muster support on the feelings
prevalent in Palestinian Society. Now Hamas is willing to ally itself
with non-Islamic forces such as the PFLP. Hamas used to have misgivings
because Fateh would ally itself with the Popular Front previously whereas
now Hamas is doing that itself...but how could there be closeness between
Hamas and the PFLP?...There are two possibilities -- the possibility of
them entering the ring of the self rule and autonomy through elections
by claiming that non-participation would leave the door open for others.
This is what was understood from the meeting of the ten factions in Damascus
-- it was leaning towards elections. This is one possibility and in fact
for any faction to participate in elections practically means a recognition
of the talks because elections are one episode in the series of the talks
and agreements. This means that if I accept elections then I practically
accept the negotiations. The other possibility is that they won't participate
in the elections and would remain as an effective opposition. In practical
terms this means that the conflict will continue between the opposition
particularly Hamas and the existing authority. The conflict might be "cold"
and peaceful through elections, celebration and issuing leaflets but it
also might be "hot" through confrontation...The first one is
more probable because all opponents are looking for chairs (authority).
They would like to have a say in what's going on but now they prefer to
be in the opposition, screaming from a distance, but if there was a one
percent success, they would find a justification to participate.
[140]
According to
Sheikh Mohammed al-Jimal who is general inspector of the Islamic Sharia
courts in the West Bank, Hamas contains some positive and some negative
elements and the behavior of some members of the movement is counter-productive
because they do not co-ordinate with the national leaders. Nevertheless,
the Sheikh believes that some Hamas members will be aligned in the future
with the nationalist group, once they witness the accomplishments of the
current peace process: "after all they are Palestinians like the
rest of us" he emphasised.
[141]
Hamas currently
solidifies its foundations on the ground in declaring its opposition to
the peace talks. Even some of those who are not Hamas advocates seem to
find some solace in the articulation of oppositional statements. The unchanged
realities in Palestinian society increase levels of anxiety among the
people while at the same time helping to deepen the justification for
Hamas' opposition.
In broad terms,
Hamas's approach to the peace process can be characterized as deliberately
ambiguous. In its publications, Hamas tends to be adamant in its opposition
to the peace process. However, in public discourse, its leaders tend to
leave the door open for political involvement. They appear to be pragmatic
in their handling of questions put to them by observers. This seeming
contradiction in Hamas's attitude stems from the fact that the movement's
ideology equates Jewishness with enmity. To them, all of Palestine belongs
to Allah. No human being can decide the destiny of that which belongs
to Allah and henceforth to all Muslims. One cannot miss such precepts
in Hamas's ideology as contained in its leaflets and other publications.
The nature of the movements leaders pronouncements, however, point in
another direction. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and other leaders, seem to emphasize
the importance of elections for deciding the desires of the people.
It is clear that
Hamas is torn between its ideological stand towards the peace process,
on the one hand, and the constraints of the current situation on the other.
Hamas preaches opposition to the current peace negotiations in its writings,
but when its leaders are confronted with questions of practicality, their
responses tend to be more conciliatory and flexible.
Given the fact that Hamas is reluctant
to reveal much information about its future intentions it is impossible
to pinpoint the exact direction that the movement will take. What is to
be expected, however, is that Hamas will continue to adapt itself to changing
conditions and circumstances in order to enhance its position by capitalizing
on the deficiencies of others. Even if it were to participate in the upcoming
autonomy elections Hamas will find the rationale to convince its constituency
that it is in their best interests to do so. At the same time Hamas will
continue to be in the opposition for the foreseeable future at least,
for it is through being in the opposition that Hamas can thrive on the
inadequacies of mainstream political measures.
[124]
Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, article 13.
[125]
Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, article 32.
[126]
Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, article 28.
[127]
Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, article 6.
[128]
Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, article 22.
[129]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[130]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[131]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[132]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[133]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[134]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[135]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[136]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[137]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[138]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[139]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[140]
Interview with highly respected religious notable and national
activist who prefers to remain anonymous.
[141]
This interview was conducted at the Sheikh's office in Jerusalem
in September 1993. It is not surprising to note that Sheikh al-Jimal
publicly identifies himself with the mainstream Palestinian leadership. |