Chapter
Two
Growth
of the Movement
Domestic
Determinants
To say that the
occupation has been largely responsible for the development of any phenomenon
in Palestinian society has become a cliche. This belief has some merits,
however, as far as the evolution of Islamic movements in the society are
concerned, particularly the formation of Hamas at the critical juncture
in Palestinian history that was the Intifada. The Muslim Brothers, as
much as nationalist groups, tried to manipulate the consequences of the
Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war to their advantage in Palestinian
society but the secularists undoubtedly enjoyed greater success in the
first few years after occupation in 1967 than did the Islamists. That
success seemed to have been short-lived, however, for while the secularists
were publicly mobilizing Palestinian masses against the occupation in
the 1970s, the religious groups, particularly the Brothers, were setting
the necessary groundwork for their programs and activities for the 1980s.
In the words of a widely respected religious notable and Palestinian national
activist:
Since 1967 the
Muslim Brotherhood movement had been leaning toward peaceful means and
methods and their activities concentrated on the issuance of publications,
educational meetings and the celebration of religious occasions. Their
situation remained as such until the year 1967. Between 1967 and 1987,
some discussion and debates took place between the Muslim brotherhood
group and other resistance groups regarding resistance activities and
concrete acts against the occupation. The response of the Muslim Brotherhood
youth was that the time had not yet arrived for that. Concentration, therefore,
was on the socialization of the youth in religious Islamic terms and in
moral and educational terms.
[20]
The Islamists
therefore, worked quietly on organizing their ranks at university campuses
and in other institutions where, during the 1970s, they established the
solid foundations needed to penetrate Palestinian society. While the widespread
popularity the secularists achieved in the 1970s did not help the Islamist
cause, in the 1980s the trend gradually started to reverse. The tremendous
decline in the PLO standing following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in 1982 was accompanied by a gradual waning of the strength of secularist
groups in the Occupied Territories. The increasing repression by Israeli
authorities throughout the period preceding the intifada only helped weaken
the secularists, in effect making it more possible for the religious groups
to organize and further enhance their ability to spread their teachings.
The worsening economic conditions in Palestinian society during that period
also made the work of the religious groups easier. More people started
turning to religion as a means of personal security.
[21]
Even more instrumental
in the formation of Hamas and the consolidation of its position in Palestinian
society was the fact that the Israeli occupation in its attempt at the
beginning of the Palestinian uprising to weaken the resolve of the secularist
movement, had remained relatively quiet as far as the activities of Hamas
were concerned. The occupation authorities acted on the premise that allowing
Hamas to grow might lead to internalizing the conflict within Palestinian
society, hence their relaxed attitude towards Hamas's role.
Indeed, Israeli
strategy to weaken the secular forces by remaining somewhat silent on
Hamas's activities bore fruit. Over the years, PLO institutions got weaker
and weaker as did other secular forces in the Occupied Territories. The
weaker the secularists got the stronger the Islamic movements, especially
Hamas, became. Constant shifts in PLO positions also enabled Islamic movements
to grow by capitalizing on what they called the `unprincipled representative
of the Palestinian people'. Ironically, through its attempts at times
to weaken the leftists on university campuses and in other unions, the
mainstream movement in the PLO, Fatah, often entered into coalitions with
the Islamists. This type of politicking, however, only assisted in the
growth of such movements.
Any analysis
of the domestic determinants shouldn't neglect the fact that the cultural
orientation of Palestinian society in Islamic teachings provided the Islamists
with a fertile ground from which to operate. The fact that most Palestinians
are born Muslims made it easier for the Islamists, and henceforth, for
Hamas to cultivate the benefits of such a social environment. Of course,
cultural upbringing has its impact on the educational system of any society
and in this regard, Islamic teachings become an integral part in the socialization
process of many Palestinians.
The continuation
of the intifada and the participation of a vast number of Palestinians
in its activities helped resolve some disagreements within the Muslim
Brotherhood. Hamas's involvement in the Uprising provided it with a successful
way out of the isolation in Palestinian society which had afflicted the
Brotherhood in earlier years. When asked about the link between the intifada
and Hamas, Jamil Hamameh replied:
After the intifada
proliferated and had completed a great part of its journey and made a
great many sacrifices and after Hamas had contributed to these sacrifices
all were convinced that Hamas was an authentic and original movement.
I say with tremendous pride and with all due respect to all political
trends who participated in the intifada that I am utterly convinced that
the Hamas movement was the new blood which gave magnitude to the intifada.
Hamas was the dynamism for the activation of the intifada with Allah's
help.
[22]
When asked whether
the Hamas movement had been formed before the beginning of the intifada
and had been preparing for it or whether they were simply simultaneous
developments, he replied:
The Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas) has had a program of preparation and guidance. The Muslim
Brotherhood movement in Palestine is part of the international Islamic
movement. It has many interests but its central preoccupation in Palestine
is the Palestinian problem. The sons of the Islamic movement were undergoing
a process of socialization and preparation and being brought up for the
moment when they would have to exercise their legitimate rights over the
soil of Palestine in resisting and ridding it of the occupier. We are
not afraid to say that in spite of arrest and imprisonment we will not
be deterred from resisting the occupation as much as our means permit.
As I told you from the beginning, the Hamas movement was not an accidental
event, not a marginal occurrence, not the result of a mere hour of work,
spur of the moment result of a whim. It is an extension of roots buried
deep in the belly of the earth and was always undergoing its preparation
in universities, mosques, unions...all of this was the infrastructure
of the Islamic resistance movement.
[23]
As can be seen
from the above the already existing structure of the Brotherhood organization
was a tremendous asset to Hamas. Instead of expending much effort and
considerable time on organizational matters, they found in the Brotherhood
a convenient base, a benefit not enjoyed by other movements. In the same
interview, in answer to a question about the particular determinants which
assisted in the birth of Hamas, Hamameh said the following:
As I said, the
Islamic Resistance Movement came naturally and a variety of factors helped
facilitate this. These objective factors served as a preparation for the
intifada. There are also factors accompanying the intifada - suppression
practised by the occupation authorities, injustice and oppression and
loss of hope and despair as far as the political solutions that were proposed
were concerned. The beginning of the weakness of the PLO and the surrender
and betrayal made by the leading forces within the PLO and their departure
from Beirut - all of this caused profound frustration for the people in
the Occupied Territories. There was a phase for preparation, for guidance
and socialization of the sons of the Islamic movement and when the right
time arrived there was the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] with its
magnitude and strength, its existence in the arena, the evolution of its
activities and its sound perspective all of which, I believe, were behind
its formation.
[24]
That the occupying
power tolerated Hamas's activities until about May 1989 for the reasons
discussed earlier, only made it easier for the new movement to solidify
its standing both functionally and organizationally. It was in May of
1989 that the Israeli authorities began to arrest top leaders in Hamas
such as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and it was only in September of the same year
that they declared the movement to be illegal.
In the first
two years of the intifada, in particular, Hamas also worked diligently
on building its financial standing in the occupied territories from mosques
and other religious and social institutions. In addition, they made good
use of the weak organizational structure of the secularist movements,
particularly Fateh, by offering their newly-joined members concrete incentives,
financially and spiritually. The prevalent traditionalism and poverty,
especially in the Gaza Strip, made it easier for Hamas to rally a sizeable
number of Palestinians around its program. Those who were previously uninvolved
began to see in Hamas an outlet for expressing their religious-political
views.
[25]
There are, however,
particular determinants behind the popularization of Hamas in the Gaza
Strip. Firstly, Gazans generally tend to be more conservative and traditionalistic
in their outlook on life. Secondly, socio-economic hardship tends to be
greater in the Gaza Strip than in other Palestinian locations. Muslim
activists confirm that the defeat in 1967 brought the movement to life
and indeed from then until the present day the number of mosques has doubled.
Among the world's most densely populated areas, Gaza is basically a city
surrounded on all sides by sprawling refugee camps. 40% of the land area
of the Gaza Strip has been seized by Israel and the unemployment rate,
which has always been high, has increased even further since March 1993
when Israel effectively sealed off the Strip and in doing so, the livelihood
of many Palestinians working as laborers in Israel.
Thirdly, Gaza
is closer geographically to Egypt than any other Palestinian region and
the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt assigned a special status to Gaza as far
as their activities were concerned, due to this geographic proximity.
In the 1950s the Brotherhood made their presence in Gaza noticeable. After
1967, they used the defeat of the Arab nation in their attempt to transform
Palestinian society, beginning with Gaza. Following the Iranian revolution,
the Brotherhood made headway in Gaza through organizing and preaching
and founded the Gaza branch of al-Azhar, the only functioning university
in Gaza, as their base of operations. In the 1980s Muslim Brothers clashed
with secularist groups, particularly leftists, on more than one occasion.
The resulting violent and tense atmosphere helped the Brotherhood assert
itself. In 1985, following the release of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, supporters
were mobilized around his cause through the largest Islamic organization
in Gaza, al-Mujamma, with a membership of over 2,000. Yassin publicly
called for transforming the society to make it more in line with Islamic
teachings. Before the intifada, the focus had been on reforming Palestinian
society from within, in effect, by marginalizing secularist activities
and presence.
[26]
Also of particular
relevance to the Gaza Strip was the noticeable increase in resistance
activities by the Islamic Jihad movement in the late 1970s. Such activities,
while directed at Israeli occupation forces, sent worrisome signals among
Hamas's ranks when it was later formed. Those individuals who originally
belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood felt that Islamic Jihad was pulling
the rug from under their feet, since a group's popularity in Palestinian
society, particularly then, was principally determined by the size and
volume of resistance activities against the occupation.
When the intifada
started, the Islamic Jihad movement were the first muntafideen
[uprisers] in practical terms along with the Fateh movement. The Islamic
Jihad movement contained few individuals but their work was strong, violent
[powerful] and effective against the Israeli occupation. The Islamic Jihad
was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood which split from the movement in
Egypt and in Gaza. They had several reservations and criticisms of the
Brotherhood leadership and their methods, thus they pursued a different
path. Therefore, when the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood saw the Islamic
Jihad movement performing this effective role they woke up and reacted
by forming a new organization and called themselves the Islamic Resistance
movement, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, the acronym of which
is Hamas.
[27]
So the increased activities of Islamic
Jihad most certainly made Muslim Brotherhood activists feel that they
had to do something about the situation; the founding of Hamas was an
effective way to achieve this objective. It is certainly no surprise that
the movement was formed and launched in the Gaza Strip and it is indeed
unlikely that any other location would have contributed even half as much
to its success. However, when asked about the actual launch of the movement
Jamil Hamameh would give no more than the following guarded comment:
The movement
emerged in the Gaza Strip and was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, may
Allah protect him and undo his troubles. The emergence and establishment
of the movement was a sudden event, unexpected by anyone, therefore it
caused shock and disbelief. I do not have the exact details of the formation
in specific terms but know it was launched in Gaza and then moved to the
West Bank where I had the honor to be selected to bridge the gap between
Hamas and Fateh through the leaflets. Among the founders known are Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Abdul Aziz Ali Rantisi - this is all
the information I have.
[28]
Since this launch
the popularity of the movement has obviously increased quite dramatically.
Jamil Hamameh was asked to assess the reasons behind the distinct popularity
which Hamas had acquired. His initial comment was the launch itself had
come from the beliefs of the people rather than the leadership and that
it was launched in an Islamic manner. He further said that:
The Hamas movement
clarified for the Palestinian people the real nature of the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict. The [military] operations by the sons of the movement then bore
testimony to its effectiveness.
[29]
When asked if
the popularity was perhaps due to the waning of belief in the nationalist
movement Hamameh replied:
The movement
becoming great [mighty] was not affected by the strength/weakness of the
other movements. This movement has become strong because of its originality.
However, when people lose hope in an ideology they would tend to seek
one that is better.
[30]
Hamameh's view
of the strength of Hamas is not shared by Sheikh Khalil al-Alami,
[31]
who although very critical of, and dissatisfied with PLO political
maneuvers, views the formation and subsequent launching of Hamas with
great skepticism. Hamas' role he suggested had been blown out of proportion
by observers which has given a mistaken impression of its effectiveness.
The methods that
Hamas used to promote itself were questioned and Hamameh was asked if
Hamas had provided systematic services and activities or had undertaken
any particular measures during the intifada to mobilize the population.
He was further asked if there were particular institutions which facilitated
this. Hamameh would not answer this question directly but instead gave
a general answer incorporating all movements.
Every movement
has its policy as much as it needs to enable it to achieve its goals.
What is important is that the beliefs and the convictions of the people
serve the movement. In my estimation all movements in the Palestinian
arena would try to establish their own institutions and Hamas is no exception.
I could not say which particular institutions are directed by those who
would serve Hamas.
[32]
Another factor
adding to the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip came in the form of
the Gulf crisis in August 1990 when many Palestinians forced out of the
Gulf region ended up in the Gaza Strip. With them they brought back not
only harsh memories, but also the lifestyle and exposure to Islamic thought
they had acquired in the Gulf over many years. In them, Hamas found a
rich environment for espousing its teachings and for increasing its base
of support. Following the Gulf crisis were two other events which helped
define Hamas as a political voice in opposition to the PLO. Firstly, the
Palestine National Council's Algiers declaration in 1988 recognizing Israel
as a state and placing it within its 1967 borders, which as far as Hamas
was concerned was an act of treason against the Palestinian people as,
"the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [holy trust] upon all Muslims
generations till the day of Resurrection." Secondly, the PLO's acceptance
of the Baker Peace Plan was seen by Hamas as another departure from the
Palestinian people's birthright as it was built on the premise of autonomy
and not liberation and retrieval. Added to the Hamas criticism of these
two events, which tapped a strong vein of common sentiment among the people,
is the fact that Israel chose this time to arrest hundreds of Hamas supporters
and sentence Ahmad Yassin to life imprisonment.
[33]
The Gulf War
itself was instrumental in the further political development of the Hamas
movement in several ways as were many other regional events which both
preceded it and came about as a result of the crisis. These regional factors
will now be discussed. Regional
Determinants
The political,
social and economic atmosphere in the Arab region following World War
II was fertile ground for extremist tendencies. The Arab defeat in the
1948 Arab-Israeli war was viewed by Islamic movements as a natural result
of the society's discarding of religion in its political life. The popularization
of Nasserism in Egypt in the 1950s and Nasser's concerted crackdown on
the Muslim Brothers led many Islamists to conclude that his proclaimed
attempt at bringing modernization to Egypt in particular, and to the Arab
region in general, was no more than a veiled effort to introduce westernization
and/or socialism, both of which were considered contributors to the spread
of corruption.
The catalyst
for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood was the Arab defeat in the 1967
Arab-Israeli war. To the Muslim Brothers, that fiasco was inevitable given
the wide gap between society and Islam and given the leaders' inability
to mobilize the people on bases other than Islamic teachings. Of particular
importance to the Brothers was the demise of Nasser's role as a result
of the war, especially after he had captured the hearts and minds of the
people with his slogans. His poor planning and unpreparedness could not
have been avoided, they argued, since his guiding principles were not
Islamic.
[34]
Following the
'67 war the technological gap between the Arab World and the West widened.
In some parts of the Arab region, many people were stricken with poverty.
This, combined with the absence of political measures to protect the civil
liberties of the Arab citizen, led many Arabs to turn to Islam as a refuge.
The greater the state of political and economic despair in the Arab World,
the more likely it was for a social shift towards religion. Certainly
the main beneficiary was the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Being the oldest
and most organized religious structure, it was relatively easy for it
to appeal to Arab public opinion through its teachings.
The death of
Nasser, the fear of a return of Nasserism and the release of many Muslim
Brothers from Egyptian prisons by the new leadership gave a tremendous
boost to the Movement. Those released influenced students at university
campus's with their teachings, including many Palestinians studying in
Egypt. Certainly, Palestinian students graduating from Egyptian universities
transmitted the teachings they had acquired to Palestinian society, in
effect serving as the leaders of various Islamic movements.
[35]
The Arab region
also affected the growth of Muslim movements in Palestinian society in
several other ways. Palestinians working in the conservative Gulf countries
undoubtedly were influenced by the religious lifestyle dominant in those
countries. They too carried what they had learned to Palestinian society,
either during annual visits or upon permanent return. Governments of some
Gulf countries played a pivotal role in supporting the growth of Islamic
movements in Palestinian society, including the growth of Hamas, through
their financial assistance to the Islamic Waqf or through the Zakat
(charitable fund) committee for the purpose of establishing and/or preserving
mosques.
[36]
Another factor
contributing to the strength of Islamic movements in Palestinian society
was the success of the Iranian Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini against
the Shah in 1979. The removal of the Shah from power in spite of Western
support for his regime, combined with the institution of Islamic law in
Iran, boosted the morale of Islamist groups and gave them a strong impetus
to replicate the Iranian experience. Furthermore it has since become an
Iranian cliche that Israel's success is due to the fact that it is a religious
state and Arab defeat is therefore because they are insufficiently devoted
to Islam. This argument is now used by Hamas against the secularism of
the PLO.
[37]
In Southern Lebanon,
as Islamic resistance fighters carried out attacks against Israeli forces,
Islamic movements in Palestinian society capitalized on such acts to enhance
their popularity and to further widen the scope of their mission.
The impact of
the region on the growth of Hamas in Palestinian society can also be seen
in the Jordanian regime's attempt to keep its influence in the area through
its support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Jordan's control of the Islamic
Waqf institutions and the consequent funds necessary for its operations
certainly helped to enhance the Islamic trend.
The Gulf War
gave a tremendous boost to the fortunes of Hamas which was very careful
about its stance at the time. They took great care with their pronouncements
in an effort to remain in favor with all countries that were important
to their finances and support. Kuwait was a country that had good ties
with Hamas and it was therefore very much in Hamas's interests to criticize
Iraq for the takeover. This they did, but in subtle pronouncements which
they ensured were overshadowed by their criticism of Western, namely US,
intervention. The criticism of Iraq satisfied the Gulf governments while
criticism of the US who, after all was the "real" enemy satisfied
the demands of their own public and of the Iranian regime. This ensured
that they maintained close contact with their supporters and funders in
both the Gulf and Iran. This stance was very different from that taken
by the PLO which expressed support of the takeover of Kuwait and support
for the regime of Saddam Hussein. This worked even further in Hamas's
favor as the Gulf countries began to see Hamas as an alternative force
to the PLO in the region. The consequence of this was the realization
that to weaken the PLO one must strengthen Hamas and following the Gulf
war much of the funding which had been earmarked for the PLO was then
transferred to the coffers of Hamas.
The loss of faith
in Arab nationalism generally after '67 and the death of Nasser was compounded
by the Gulf War. Iraq's ill-fated attempt to assert Arab Nationalist dominance
and Arafat's ill-fated decision to support it did Arab nationalism generally,
but in Palestinian society in particular, no favors whatsoever. Indeed,
the PLO stance in the Gulf and Iraq's consequent defeat came to be seen
by many Palestinians as symptomatic of the inability of the whole nationalist
ethos to truly address any of their grievances.
In light of the
above, it is obvious that several circumstantial, cultural and regional
factors were brought to bear upon the evolution of Hamas. The movement
worked diligently to capitalise on regional events and to reap the fruit
of several developments, particularly conflicts. The fact that Hamas was
in its infancy, did not sway it from widening its base and attracting
supporters. Without a regional context which would make its local presence
and effectiveness possible, Hamas would, with all certainty, have had
greater difficulties. International events also assisted the movement
as the ensuing pages will demonstrate.
International
Determinants
The gradual collapse
of the Socialist bloc in the mid - to late 1980s provided Islamic movements
in general, and those in Palestinian society in particular, with a strong
weapon in their march towards public recognition. The death of Communism
not only meant the removal of the Soviet empire from the political map
of the world, but was also interpreted by Islamists as signifying an exclusive
viability of Islam as way of life. To them the Soviet Union was dissolved
not because of a countervailing military power but because of its disavowal
of Islam as the only "correct" way of life.
[38]
Before the mid-1980s the main power struggle was seen as that
between communism and capitalism or Soviet Union and United States. The
attention of the media and therefore the public generally was devoted
to the configuration of power exemplified by the cold war. Despite the
fact that the Soviet Union and the United States never came into direct
confrontation, the closest being in the 1960s with the Cuban missile crisis,
there are various examples where they fought through "client regimes".
In Afghanistan the power that eventually forced the Soviet Union
out, and in a military manner, was the Islamist movement. Although the
mujaheddiin, were not weapons manufacturers and their military
action against the Soviet Union was heavily reliant on the United States
for its equipment, the perception of this action and the power struggle
involved that forced the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was that it
had been entirely a victory for the mujaheddiin, vanguards of Islam,
and, therefore, Islam itself. The United States could not defeat the Soviets
directly but under the rubric of the Islamic movement which it supplied,
its national interest was served. Islam therefore came to be seen as an
effective tool for bringing change.
The eventual Soviet withdrawal was therefore
perceived as a great triumph for Islam and a sign of its potential, especially
given the sheer size and might of the Soviet Union at the time. This served
as an incredibly strong mobilizing impetus to other Islamic movements
such as Hamas. The former government of Najibullah Khan had to ensure
close links with its religious leadership in order to maintain and broaden
its support.
[39]
Since the Soviet
Union has collapsed the Islamic movement has, almost by default, become
more of a threat to the United States than the former Soviet Union. This
perception and the psychological boost it gives to the Hamas movement
cannot be underestimated.
As the Soviet
Union was dissolving there was another power at work which would serve
as a challenge to Western power: Iraq. In attempting to assert the vitality
of Arab nationalism, Iraq took over Kuwait in August 1990. With the sanction
of the Soviet Union via the UN security council the United States and
the USSR were effectively united against a third party for the first time.
The failure of Saddam Hussein's enterprise was interpreted by Hamas as
a defeat for nationalism, leaving Palestine with Islam (and Hamas) as
the only alternative.
Islamists generally
do not differ too much between East and West insofar as the attitude of
both to Islam is unfavorable. They consider there to be an inherent enmity
between Islam and the way of life it entails and both the Western and
Eastern ways of life, capitalism as is and Communism as was. The belief
that the victory of the mujaheddiin in Afghanistan was a sign that
if Islam can defeat one of these powers, there is no reason why it cannot
defeat the other, undoubtedly gave a huge boost to the ability of Hamas
to rally the Palestinian people around its cause. The collapse of the
Soviet Union was taken as the collapse and diminution if not disappearance
of the credibility of Marxism, leaving a huge vacuum in the political
influence of the leftist groups in Palestinian society. Hamas capitalized
on this vacuum, being able not only to cite the victory of Islam against
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but also to belittle the beliefs of the
secular Palestinian left for adhering to what had become an ideology without
credibility. This dual attack deeply affected the support of the secular
left trend in Palestinian society which became even less able to meet
the demands of the Palestinian people and Hamas took the stage like a
long awaited Messiah.
Other international
influences on or inspirations for Islamic movements are obviously Iran's
Islamic revolution and subsequent financial support for Hamas, particularly
after the start of the intifada. Other sources of material support for
Hamas are various, notably, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Sudan and Algeria.
The subtle stand taken by Hamas over the Gulf crisis resulted in increased
support from the Gulf and Iranian contributions also increased as did
their provision of military training.
[40]
An indirect consequence
of any successful Islamic movement, and this was particularly the case
following Afghanistan, is an increased incentive to give funds to other
movements. Donations from individuals are received through Islamic organizations,
and Hamas has been a direct beneficiary of the Afghan success. "Muslims
throughout the world, including in Europe and the United States are now
offering support to the mujaheddiin of Palestine."
[41]
The sudden focus
on Islam of the world media has been criticized as no more than the West
finding a new enemy now that communism has surrendered.
[42]
The portrayal of Islamic trends or actions throughout the
world though generally negative have nevertheless resulted in high international
visibility which serves the aims of movements like Hamas. An event such
as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center can be seen as a success
on the international stage as far as showing power is concerned and is
a reminder not only of the seriousness with which Islamic movements demand
to be taken but also of their increasing international spread. Such an
incident dispels any notion that may have been held that they are localized
and do not come close enough to the West to seriously affect its societies.
Based on the
above it can be seen that Hamas has capitalized on events in several parts
of the world, it has tried to benefit from triumphs and losses. The influences
brought to bear upon it are too many to enumerate here, in every corner
of the globe, however, one incident here and another there, helped shape
the meaning of the movement, the definition of its goals and the articulation
of its message. Even where Hamas played no role it did not shy away from
attempting to claim partnership and/or responsibility and further used
events to emphasize the universality of the Islamic mission.
[20]
Interview conducted by the
author on October 4th 1993, with a widely respected religious notable
and national activist and one of the most highly respected imams
at al-Aqsa mosque who asked to remain anonymous.
[21]
Rekhess. Elie, "The Iranian
impact on the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip." The Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Tel Aviv University, January 1988.
pp 4.
[22]
Jamil Hamameh interview. (See
Historico-Political background, footnote 7.)
[23]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[24]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[25]
Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the territories occupied in 1967."
p. 7-11. News From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992.
[26]
Rekhess. Elie, Op. cit. p.
5.
[27]
Interview conducted by the
author on October 4th 1993, with a widely respected religious notable
and national activist and one of the most highly respected imams
at al-Aqsa mosque who asked to remain anonymous.
[28]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[29]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[30]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[31]
Sheikh Khalil al-Alami, an
imam at the al-Aqsa mosque, was interviewed at his office in
Jerusalem in September 1993.
[32]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[33]
Usher. Graham, "The rise
of political Islam in the Occupied Territories." Middle East
International. No. 453 - 25 June 1993. p 20.
[34]
Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the territories occupied in 1967."
News From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992. pp 7. (See
also Rekhess. Elie, "The Iranian impact on the Islamic Jihad movement
in the Gaza Strip." Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Tel
Aviv University. Jan. 1988.)
[35]
Jaradat. Muhammed, Ibid
pp 7.
[36]
See Shadid. Mohammed K. "The
Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza." Third
World Quarterly. Vol. 10. No. 2.
April 1988. pp 667.
[37]
Salame. Ghassan, "Islam
and the West." Foreign Policy. No. 90 - Spring 1993. pp
29.
[38]
Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the territories occupied in 1967."
p. 7-11. News From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992.
[39]
Abu-Amr. Ziad, "Hamas:
A Historical and Political Background." Journal of Palestine
Studies. Volume XXII. Number 4. Summer 1993. pp 16-17.
[40]
Ramati. Yohanan, "Islamic
Fundamentalism Gaining." Midstream-A Monthly Jewish Review.
Vol. 39 - No. 2 - 1993 pp 3.
[41]
Abu-Amr. Ziad, Op cit. pp
17.
[42]
Salame. Ghassan, "Islam
and the West." Foreign Policy. No. 90 - Spring 1993. pp
23. |