<< Previous | Introduction | Chapters: 1  2  3  4  5 | Conclusion | Epilogue | Next >>

Chapter One

 

 

The rise of the Movement

 

Historico‑Political Background

 

As is the case with any movement, be it religious, political and/or otherwise, Hamas was not born in a vacuum. Its emergence was surrounded by a variety of circumstances, some of which were psychological in nature, pertaining to the make-up of the personalities of those individuals who launched the movement. Others were grounded in history - a yearning for the ancient past and an attempt to revive long dreamed of hopes. Yet other circumstances were unique to the political environment in which Hamas was born - unique because of the domestic realities inculcated in Palestinian society, because of the ineptness of the Arab World in the situation in which it found itself during the late 1980s and finally because of the suggested demotion of the Question of Palestine by the international community. Hamas had its roots in other preceding movements particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Owing to the importance of the link between the Brotherhood and Hamas, it is necessary to trace the background of the parent movement to understand Hamas itself.   

 

The Brotherhood movement, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, was not involved in Palestine until the Palestinian revolt of 1936-39 during which time Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, Hassan's brother, came to Palestine helping to channel funds and to aid in this revolt. This proved to be the beginning of what subsequently developed into an extensive network of the Brotherhood's presence in Palestine. [4] Nearly two decades after its formation in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood founded its first group in Jerusalem in 1946, ostensibly to resist the Zionist project for Palestine. Soon after its establishment the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine gained the support of some nationalist leaders such as the preeminent al-Haj Amin al-Husseini. Al-Husseini's endorsement of the movement apparently gave it enough strength to widen its base as it opened offices in other Palestinian cities, such as Haifa and Jaffa, in the same year.

 

Gradually, the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Palestine attracted the backing of various nationalist groups. The overriding priority at the time was to resist the British Mandate and the Zionist project. Since the Brotherhood portrayed themselves as a resistance force, its endorsement seemed inevitable. Thus, when the 1948 war broke out, the Brotherhood movement participated in spite of opposition from some Arab governments. The leader of the movement in Egypt, Hassan al-Banna, launched three brigades of volunteers to fight in the war for Palestine. Those volunteers were joined by others from Palestine, Jordan and Syria, all fighting under the banner of one movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.

 

As might be expected, in the aftermath of the 1948 war the membership of the Brotherhood increased considerably in Palestinian society. The Egyptian government banned the movement in the Gaza Strip between 1949 and 1952 although relations improved again between '52 and `54. Despite being outlawed again in 1954 following the attempt on Nasser's life, by the mid 1950s the Brotherhood had become the strongest political force in the Gaza Strip with the size of its constituency exceeding that of some other nationalist groups such as the Communists. When the Brotherhood advocated armed struggle in response to the 1956 Suez invasion, membership increased and the rift between it and the Communists, who advocated non-violent resistance, widened. The Brotherhood formed underground groups to resist the occupation as it had done throughout Egypt in the 1950s. Interestingly enough, members of many of these groups were to move on to the Palestine Liberation Organization, where some of them now hold senior positions.

 

The rise of the Nationalist and Baathist parties in the late 1950s led to a loss of support and, as the Brotherhood got weaker in the Gaza Strip, it modified its agenda for Palestinian society, focusing in the 1960s on a process of non-violent activities, distribution of pamphlets and social and religious gatherings.

 

The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood did not advocate military activities in the West Bank apparently provided it with benefits other political parties did not enjoy. The Muslim Brotherhood was officially recognized by the Jordanian government while other parties were outlawed. The openness with which the Brotherhood conducted its activities helped widen its popular base giving it another advantage over other groups.

 

Closeness between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian government did not mean that their relationship was always cordial. On the one hand, the Jordanian government was alert enough not to let the Brotherhood's influence get out of control. On the other there were several occasions when the Brotherhood clashed with the Jordanian Government over domestic policy matters, particularly concerning alcohol consumption and some Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested by Jordanian authorities. However, the Brotherhood's support of King Hussein created a relative equilibrium in Jordanian-Brotherhood relations over the years. Both the King and Brotherhood members had shared interests: they had  common enemies in the nationalists and the communists while the popularization of Nasser of Egypt as a pan-Arab leader also helped unify the forces of both sides.

 

This relationship between the Brotherhood and the Hashemites affected Palestinian society in several ways. The Brotherhood participated in Jordanian parliamentary elections consistently from the beginning of the 1950s, using their official presence as a means to advance their cause. Even when the nationalist Palestinian political parties boycotted Jordanian elections, as was the case in 1962, the Brotherhood participated. Although the power they managed to muster in the parliament was modest at best, the Brotherhood chose to maintain its presence in the Jordanian political process to counteract the influence of other political groups.

 

Throughout the period before 1967 and despite occasional friction, cordial relations were maintained with the Jordanian regime. While the Brotherhood appeared to be in opposition at times, they were nonetheless loyal to the King, at no point participating in no-confidence votes against him.

 

Following the 1967 war, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to remain on the sidelines as far as violent resistance activities were concerned. The atmosphere of relative calm with which the Brotherhood surrounded themselves in the aftermath of '67 helped them develop the strongest Islamic movement in Palestinian society; throughout the 1970s, no other Islamic group posed a credible challenge to the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the nationalist groups, they did not provoke either the occupation authorities or the Jordanian regime. Yet, while the nationalists enjoyed popular support owing to their participation in resisting the occupation, the Brotherhood worked diligently on building its infrastructure and organization in Palestinian society.

 

While the nationalist groups relied on underground organizational activities, the Muslim Brotherhood used open mass mobilization to recruit members. It chose locations such as universities, schools and mosques, where its most influential members would go to publicize its message by lecturing, preaching and distributing literature. The Brotherhood wanted to portray the image of a credible Islamic group, a group whose orientation is religious and whose agenda is meant to serve only the cause of Allah. In order to secure a smooth path for holding public lectures on university campuses under occupation, it wisely remained silent as far as occupation practices were concerned.

 

The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising - the intifada, in the occupied territories in December 1987 presented the Muslim Brotherhood with a chance to connect itself to the Palestinian cause in a manner acceptable to the majority of the people. Previously, the Brotherhood's focus on the overall religious mission to proliferate the society with Islamic teachings and education, somewhat subsumed the underlying political concerns of the people. The "liberation of Palestine" in the mind of the Brotherhood was to be considered only after liberating the people socially, or only after returning them to the "right path" of Islam.

 

The intifada, gave the Brotherhood a badly needed opportunity to convince the people of the efficacy of their outlook on life, politically, socially and educationally. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood had little choice but to adopt such a position at that critical juncture in Palestinian history when the younger generation of the Brotherhood were rather weary of political non-involvement. This fact is quite succinctly put by one widely respected religious notable and national activist who prefers to remain anonymous:

 

The young generation, those who were involved in Palestinian universities and colleges, felt that they were considerably behind in the struggle against the occupation when compared to nationalist groups, therefore they were insistent on forming Hamas without notifying their elderly leaders who, in return, had no choice but to go along with the young generations spirited resistance.

 

Some leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood felt that the [Islamic] Jihad movement, a splinter group from the brotherhood, was quite active in the resistance process against the Israeli occupation  especially in Gaza. That feeling of envy led some of those leaders to consider the formation of a movement for the purpose of resisting the occupation. [5]

Direct resistance activities to the Israeli occupation by members of the Islamic Jihad who held the same basic beliefs, made the position of the Muslim Brotherhood most complicated after the outbreak of the intifada. Continued political non-involvement would have meant a deterioration in the popular support of the Brotherhood and it is doubtful that the leadership could have reconciled itself to such an option.

 

The Muslim Brotherhood leadership thought that to create Hamas in this atmosphere at the beginning of the intifada, would conceal the link between it and the unrest. In other words, launching Hamas was meant to give the impression that the Brotherhood had nothing to do with the intifada, especially when the leadership was not sure that it would continue to the extent that it did. It is also important to note that there was clear disagreement among the Brotherhood leadership regarding the intifada, thus it was thought that launching Hamas might relieve the internal strife and satisfy competing positions within the movement. The idea to create a separate organization was that of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin [6] a man paralyzed by illness and a renowned authority on Islamic matters. Until the intifada Sheikh Yassin had been active in religious and cultural areas of Palestinian life but had not advocated violent activities against the occupation.

 

Disagreements and uncertainty within the Brotherhood ranks apparently led some Hamas members to try to conceal their links with the parent movement. The Brotherhood's seemingly aloof position towards the Palestinian cause on university campuses and in other institutions did not please Hamas activists and somewhat swayed them from taking pride in their connection with their parent organization. Thus in its early leaflets for several months after its launching, Hamas did not mention its connection with the Brotherhood and it was not until May 1988 that Hamas declared itself to be the Brotherhood's military wing. As it became clear that the Intifada was a fact of life in Palestinian society, disagreements within the ranks of the Brotherhood were resolved since the uncertainty began to dissipate, helping  Hamas's image and legitimizing its connection with the Brotherhood. [7] As pointed out by one interviewee in October 1993:

 

Hamas launched its activities in the same way as other factions in the context of the intifada. Once Hamas had proved its existence on the ground the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood then adopted and started to support the Hamas activists. [8]

 

When questioned further on the reasons that motivated the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to recognize Hamas the same interviewee made the following clarification:

 

The leadership pursued the least harmful option, if it had not recognized Hamas this could have led to all of the Brotherhood activists to join Hamas out of support and encouragement. The facts on the ground made the leadership recognize Hamas and in addition, recognition was a way of containment so that Hamas activists would remain under their observance and could have their activities monitored and so wouldn't be viewed as a splinter group. The Brotherhood had suffered several times from splits and at the very least, instead of considering Hamas a splinter group they adopted it and considered it their own. [9]

 

Jamil Hamameh [10] a renowned Palestinian Islamist outlined quite succinctly the connection of Hamas to the Muslim Brotherhood:

The Hamas movement is not a new movement but is the natural extension of a movement that is already large and great and which has its roots buried deep in the earth of Palestine. This is the movement of the Muslim Brothers. Hamas has unequivocally and formally announced in its leaflets and its covenant of July 1988 [sic] that it is the political [sic] wing of the Brotherhood, the strong wing of the Brotherhood. It is part and parcel of the Muslim Brotherhood which exists in the international arena and not just in the Palestinian and Arab arenas. It is a movement which has been in existence for more than 50 years and Hamas, therefore, was born naturally through this movement even if the name differed or the style differed. 

 

The Muslim Brotherhood has never forgotten, even for a day, the Palestinian problem. The mujaheddiin [soldiers] of the Brotherhood before, during and after 1948 are testament to that. The concern of the teacher [Sheikh Hassan] al-Banna, the founder of the movement, was to form brigades from among the brothers to defend the soil of Palestine after it was subjugated by the British Mandate and too many things in Palestine became under the control of the Jews. [11]

 

The Brotherhood's work on university campuses and in other grass-roots settings strengthened its foundations and created a degree of dependency on its institutions. The intifada for its part gave a strong boost to the rise of the movement to no less an extent than did the movement to the intifada. In other words, for better or worse, the intifada and Hamas became intertwined in many different ways. Firstly, the intifada gave Hamas the forum it badly needed to articulate its message, not to mention the fact that without the intifada, the birth of Hamas would have been unlikely or untimely at best. Secondly, it was obvious from the beginning that Hamas was a strong force to fuel the intifada and to provide it with the kind of steam it needed to help keep it going. The power of seemingly religious convictions on the part of Hamas activists gave them the stimulus necessary to participate in and/or initiate intifada activities. The impact on Palestinian society of Hamas leaflets and communiques is a third important factor. In addition to shaping the thought processes of many individuals within the society, such writings affected the work of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) and secularist groups. Not only did they need to address the concerns of the society in the context of Palestinian - occupation relationships, but also to deal with the impact of Hamas information and directives became a political imperative. The strength and/or weakness of the intifada undoubtedly became inseparable from the degree of support that Hamas enjoyed and though this is not to suggest that Hamas came to control the rise and fall of the intifada, it can be said with certainty that the magnitude of the intifada became intricately linked to Hamas's influence. While Hamas became an important power behind the intifada, the intifada itself became a reality on which Hamas could not turn its back. The future of Hamas may be said to have become dependent on the intifada though Hamas successfully used the intifada to solidify its presence and thereby carve out a path for itself even in a non-intifada future. As has been said, Hamas was not born in a vacuum and therefore cannot be expected to live in one. That is to say that since the historico-political platform upon which Hamas erected its foundations was embedded in its parent the Muslim Brotherhood, it is reasonable to assume that the ability of Hamas to endure could not have been sustained unparented. Hamas enjoyed the luxury of circumstances to aid in its birth from within - the intifada, its dynamics, evolution and effect - as well as from without - the network it had at hand to establish wide ranging relationships among sympathetic supporters.

 

Hamas seems to have been perspicacious enough not to link the nature of its future with that of the intifada, the latter is a phase, albeit an important one in Palestinian political, economical, social and psychological history which is also the case for Hamas. The intifada, while contributing to carving up the political path of the society for many years to come, will, in all likelihood, be superseded or even subsumed by newer, perhaps fresher phases. Hamas, on the other hand not only helped shape the course of the intifada and its consequent developments, but more importantly managed to permeate the fabric of Palestinian Society in a manner which qualifies it as a force whose effect could go far beyond the impact made by the intifada. With all that the intifada has generated - tens of hundreds of Palestinians killed, thousands wounded and imprisoned, economic and social infrastructure devastated and profound societal demoralization - the overall power that Hamas has been able to generate in and on that society will be much greater. In the following pages this issue will also be one which this study will attempt to address.

Socio‑Economic Characteristics

As one would expect, the socio‑economic characteristics of Hamas are very much like its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. At its inception, the Muslim Brothers, by‑and‑large, came from small towns in Egypt, particularly from among the ranks of the lower middle class. Many of those who joined the brotherhood migrated to the cities and similarly, those who joined Islamic movements such as Hamas, outside of Egypt, were lower middle class members generally academically oriented towards the natural sciences. They also tend to come from villages and small towns.

Several reasons seem to explain this socio‑economic makeup. Owing to the fact that many movement members grew up in villages and/or small towns, they tend to be most susceptible to the promise of a better life afforded by the processes of modernization in the city. The impoverishment by which they were surrounded in the village, combined with the secularization and continued socio‑economic gaps they experience in their new environments, can cause considerable anger and bitterness.

 

This bitterness can be strengthened and deepened proportionately with the enhancement of education and the more educated members become, the more rejecting of the existing socio‑economic order they tend to be. This is compounded by the fact that new migrants to a city, lacking the "sophistication" of city dwellers can often be subject to feelings of inferiority in their new surroundings.

This raises a related point which is that migration from villages to cities is often accompanied by social alienation in the new environment as well as by loss of identity. Since most of these particular migrants find themselves living in the impoverished outskirts of the cities, they are likely to resent excessive wealth, loss of identity and corruption. Hence they begin to organize under the rubric of religion as a safeguard against the unpredictable ills of their new environment.

Furthermore, many members are educated in the natural sciences and are familiar with the world of modern technology, but only as far as their academic training requires. Education is seen as being received in an academic vacuum which lacks any relation to the spiritual or humane. This in turn encourages a cold attitude towards modernity. The introduction to modernity through only technical means can also promote the view that modernity will lead to gradual "moral disintegration". A tendency has also been noted that members have rejected traditional religious organizations for being too passive or too subservient to the government and therefore too much a part of the existing social order to offer satisfactory refuge. [12]

The gap between people in such circumstances and the dominant social order in the city contributes to further psychological, social, economic and political distance. Exclusion from the prosperous strata who enjoy the benefits of modernity while they have to live in slums and pray in deteriorating mosques, increases the alienation which becomes the strong driving force for them to resent, reject and organize. Their objective is to preserve themselves as individuals, preserve their identity and their consciousness, even if this means coming into open clashes with those they perceive as their "alienators". Protection of themselves means fighting against all that which is considered to contribute to the breakdown in society and in order to raise their own morale they reflect on a utopian past and reinstate this ideal as an offensive to the present.

They are however, a product of modernity; a modern people who see themselves as enlightened but alienated from enlightenment. Consequently, Islamic principles seem more precious than ever before as adoption of an Islamic way of life relieves the suffering encountered in their modern lives. In particular, if this suffering is perceived as part of a history of persecution, they can liken themselves to the Muslims at the beginning of their empire who, though numerically disadvantaged, managed to successfully battle the Jahilites or unenlightened ones. [13]

Although this is a scenario for the composition of Islamic movements in general, and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it provides an excellent illustration of the socio-economic characteristics which are evident within the Hamas movement.

Palestinian political leaders and spokespersons for the mainstream tend to come from cities or at least large towns and, more often than not, from the richer West Bank. Most would be considered members of the middle class and have a relatively comfortable family background. Members of the secular leftist groups although having a wider base of origin also tend to be members of the middle class. Hamas members on the other hand tend to be from either smaller towns or villages or from areas hit most heavily by occupation. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual head of Hamas, for example, was one of the many whose families were made refugees in 1948 and he grew up in Gaza. Dr. Ibrahim al-Yazuri, also among those considered the founding members of Hamas, was born in Beit Daraz village and, following the al-Nakbah (catastrophe) in 1948, moved to Gaza City and then to Khan Younis refugee camp. The conditions in the Palestinian camps, particularly in the Gaza Strip, are abysmal. They are densely populated with many families often having to share makeshift dwellings. Inadequate garbage disposal and open street sewers add to the incidence of disease and ill health.

In many cases, in the perception of many Palestinians at least, it can be said that the lives of a lot of Hamas members have been a microcosm of the collective suffering of the Palestinian people. Abdul Aziz Ali Rantisi, Lecturer in the Science faculty at the Islamic University in Gaza states the following about his personal history: 

I was born in Jibna, which was a village between Ashdud and Jaffa. We were dismissed from our village and had to live in a tent in Khan Younis [Gaza Strip] in very miserable conditions. I left the tent and moved to the UNRWA camps where I still live. I am from a very poor family but before 1948 we were wealthy. Our home still exists and is occupied by Jews from Yemen. My family is religious. [14]

Educationally, Hamas members tend to fit the characterization outlined above and many engineers and doctors in the West Bank and Gaza, claim allegiance to the movement. Sheikh Hamad Bitawi a judge in the sharia court in Tulkarem was among those deported by the Israeli authorities to Marj al Zuhour in December 1992 following the killing, allegedly by Hamas, of Nissim Toledano, an Israeli police officer. (This measure which involved the deportation of 415 alleged Hamas and Islamic Jihad members will be considered in greater detail at a later point). In an interview conducted in November 1993, with Sheikh Bitawi after his return, the following was noted:

This crime [the deportation] was committed by the Israeli authorities to rid Palestine of her scientific talents. 415 of us were deported, tens of our number are holders of Doctorates, Masters and many are university graduates - doctors, engineers, judges, professors and faculty members from al-Azhar, an-Najah, Hebron and al-Quds Universities. [15]

Consistent with the socio-economic conditions outlined above, it is in Gaza in particular where the movement is at its strongest. Although the occupation obviously affects the whole region, Gaza is so impoverished and seemingly forgotten by the outside world that it is a million miles away from cities elsewhere in terms of wealth and lifestyle. The fact that the movement began under military occupation lends further support to claims of righteousness and the use of historical reference is evident in many Hamas leaflets. Frequent references are made to: the Battle of Yarmuk (634ce) the hero of which, Khalid Ibn al-Walid, was referred to as the sword of Allah by the prophet Mohammad; Salah al-Din who defeated the Crusaders in 1187; Bibars who fought the Crusaders in 1260; and Jaf'r Ibn abu Talib who fought against the Byzantines. Another popular reference used by Hamas is to the Khaybar which was a Jewish settlement on the Arabian Peninsula. In 628ce the inhabitants were accused of treachery by the prophet Mohammad and then conquered and massacred by the Muslims. Hamas leaflets have often been known to conclude with the words "Allah Akbar - the hour of Khaybar has come". [16]

In the Hamas covenant published in 1988, which will also be considered in detail in a later chapter, the historical reference is more recent although the notion of a continuing struggle is very clear:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a link in {a long} chain of the Jihad against the Zionist occupation, which is connected and tied with the initiation {of the Jihad} of the martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam [17] and his Mujahid [soldier] brothers in 1936. [18]

In conclusion it is clear that the Hamas members thus far considered do generally originate from small towns or villages. While not necessarily exposed to the excesses of wealth to provide a contrast to their poverty, the circumstances of Israeli occupation add an extra dimension to their alienation. This, of course, is alienation from their own land. In the Hamas covenant it is stated that expulsion is a kind of murder and seeing as the whole land of Palestine is considered by Hamas to be Islamic Waqf or trust land for Muslims until the day of resurrection, any loss of land particularly through occupation is a heinous wrongdoing. To quote Sheikh Bitawi on his experience of expulsion once more:

To be away from the homeland was the most difficult trial to endure. If there was a choice between death and the loss of ones homeland, one would choose death. [19]

The fact of displacement alone can therefore be sufficient reason for joining a movement which aims to redress this wrong. Even without the religious connotation of alienation from the homeland, there is a loss of livelihood, property and heritage which are sufficient in themselves to make the Hamas movement attractive to those who have suffered them.

It is these particular national determinants which led to the rise of the Hamas movement which will be next addressed.