REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
Thank you for this opportunity to present a summary of the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s (Board) observations and recommendations of the past year. The Board’s annual report will present a comprehensive view of key issues and programs, and include a summary of the Board’s positions and recommendations on specific issues.
This year was special because the Board celebrated the 50th anniversary of its origin. In the fall of 1947, as the initial step in compliance with the wishes of Congress under the National Security Act, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, appointed the Committee on Civilian Components under the chairmanship of Mr. Gordon Gray, then Assistant Secretary of the Army. The Committee’s purpose was to strengthen all elements of the Reserve components of the armed services. This Committee was the forerunner of the present Board.
The Board serves as an independent policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve components. Representatives from each of the Service Secretariats, active components, and Reserve components serve as Board members. The Board offers independent advice on Reserve strengths, readiness, and other critical Reserve component issues. The Reserve component Board members represent a wide range of industrial, business, professional, and civic experience, in addition to their military expertise.
Although the Board normally meets four times a year, in 1997 it met seven times. Additionally, through the use of teleconferencing and e-mail, its ad hoc committees operated virtually full time. The Board departed from its normal meeting format and, in coordination with the National Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and National Defense University, conducted three separate symposiums entitled Total Force 2010. The symposium format was chosen because it afforded the opportunity for personal interaction among the range of persons from whom input was sought. The symposiums were also structured to develop specific recommendations in a relatively short period. The Board deliberately chose to go well outside its own membership in selecting symposium participants. In addition to congressional representatives, participants included experts from academia, industry, Reserve and Guard Associations, think tanks, the General Accounting Office, the Departments of Defense and Transportation, state and local governments, and Reserves from friendly and allied governments.
In its congressionally mandated role as an independent advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Guard and Reserve issues, the Board maintained a strong interest in the portrayal of the Reserve components throughout the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process and the National Defense Panel (NDP). It has long been the opinion of the Board that with a consistent, defense-wide approach to Total Force integration, the nation could gain more combat capability and could expect peacetime support from America’s citizen-military. Since the end of the Cold War, the active component has been cut by a third, yet missions and deployments have tripled. The Reserve components have been fully accessible in the post-Cold War era, resulting in the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Reserve components increasing significantly. It was with this thesis that the Board embarked on this symposium series. The Board considered the many aspects and implications of full integration of Guard and Reserve forces with their respective active military Service.
The first symposium took place in Theodore Roosevelt Hall, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, and sought to describe the Total Force integration needed to win on the battlefield. It succeeded in identifying integration issues for consideration in the QDR process. The Board also submitted the following three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:
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That the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the QDR to ensure Total Force structure decisions be made based on Joint Force Requirements Determination rather than traditional approach of preserving Service force structure.•
That the Secretary of Defense hold the Service chiefs accountable for Reserve component readiness. Inherent in this responsibility are common metrics, capabilities, equipment standards, and readiness tailored to assigned mission.•
That the Secretary of Defense direct the Services to identify and eliminate the cultural and structural barriers to effectively integrate active and Reserve components by September 2000.The second symposium met in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Cambridge Experience, as the second symposium became known, sought to identify long-term means for enhancing the integration of forces by the year 2010. Some of the recommendations included:
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The creation of a category of Reserve who are available for long-term augmentation to the active forces, yet remain under the Reserve flag.•
The mobilization process, to include all enabling legislation, should be redesigned to facilitate the increased use of the Guard and Reserve.•
Strong consideration should be given to increasing the missions of the Guard and Reserve, especially for the purpose of freeing up flexible full-time members for modernization, reducing OPTEMPO, and executing military operations other than war.•
Identify policies, and new tools and incentives for attracting and retaining Guard and Reserve personnel in the year 2010.The third symposium, held at the National War College, allowed the Board to finalize recommendations on the programmatic and systematic changes necessary for the Guard and Reserve to be fully optimized. This symposium investigated post-QDR integration alternatives to allow the Total Force to be effective and efficient at all levels of war, in all environments; to keep peace throughout the world conducting operations other than war; and to build international political, economic, and military relationships supporting the military strategy of peacetime engagement.
These symposiums were designed to afford the QDR and the NDP innovative thinking regarding Reserve component employment and integration with the active component. Additionally, the symposiums provided the Secretary of Defense with improvements and alternatives to the QDR that reasonably meet political, fiscal, and military realities. The QDR will be influenced by budget challenges, how two major theater wars will be fought, grassroots support at home, forward presence, civilian oversight, modernization, state governors and political influence, as well as Reserve component peacetime participation. The main outcome of the three symposiums was the need for a Total Force integration policy. The symposiums also identified Reserve component roles and missions, and other alternatives in conjunction with the QDR and NDP.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in conjunction with the Board, developed and coordinated a Total Force integration policy. The Secretary of Defense emphasized the integration of the Reserve and Active components in a memorandum to all Department of Defense leaders and commanders on September 4, 1997. The Secretary asked that an environment be created that eliminates all residual barriers—structural and cultural—for effective integration within the Total Force. The Secretary defines integration as "the conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership at all levels to have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are set for the unit—in peace and war." The memorandum states that only when the following four basic principles are achieved throughout the Department of Defense will Total Force be a reality:
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Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by senior leaders throughout the Total Force.•
Clear and mutual understanding of the missions of each unit—active, Guard and Reserve—in Service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war.•
Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.•
Leadership by senior commanders—active, Guard and Reserve—to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.The 21st century goal is to have a seamless Total Force that provides the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations.
During the year, the Board addressed a number of issues of concern to the Guard and Reserve. The Board recommends allowing Reserve members to obtain government rates when purchasing tickets for travel to inactive duty training. The cost incurred by Reservists traveling to inactive duty training impacts recruiting and retention of skilled Reservists and thus affects readiness. As Reservists participate in more operational missions and perform more duty, more travel at the individual Reservist’s expense will be required. Today’s Reservists are highly mobile, skilled workers whose civilian occupations often require relocation and quite often a longer commute. The Board is also reviewing issues on parity of pay and benefits for active and Reserve service; a single pay and personnel system; the availability of medical benefits for dependents of Reservists on active duty less than 31 days; and the continuing push for a Joint Total Force SMART ID card.
Considerable attention and discussion focused on producing a vision statement for the role of the Guard and Reserve. The Board’s vision is: "To enhance national defense, the Reserve components must be fully integrated, ready forces with relevant missions, able to operate across the entire spectrum of military requirements."
In addition to the vision statement, the Board recommended nine guiding principles to follow when utilizing the Reserve component. The nine guiding principles are:
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The nation should place maximum reliance on the Reserve components and, when utilized, put them as close to the fight as possible.•
Reserve components must participate at policy, planning, and decision making levels.•
Reserve components must be resourced, equipped, and trained to meet requirements.•
Utilization of the Reserve components against threats to national security promotes national will.•
To be a credible force, each Reserve component must be trained to operate the primary weapon systems of its Service.•
Active and Reserve component systems must be interoperable.•
The process to access the Reserve components should be easy, fast, and funded.•
Commanders in chief must state the requirements and then allow the Services and their Reserve components the flexibility to satisfy the requirements.•
Combat capability can be cost effectively maintained in the Reserve components if resourced and trained at the proper unit level.The world political, economic, and strategic situation continues to change more rapidly than our evolving military force structure. Some of our former enemies are now friends. World events have caused a slight shift from the possibility of two major theater wars to smaller-scale contingencies. The Department of Defense enforces embargoes and no-fly zones on other nations, stations peacekeeping forces on several continents, evacuates noncombatants from warring countries, and helps establish legitimate governments in other nations. Most of the missions involve the Total Force. We must continue to maximize the core advantages of the Reserves in both smaller-scale contingencies and major theater war.
The Reserve Forces Policy Board’s annual report, entitled Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1997, is scheduled for publication in March 1998. It will provide more detailed information regarding Reserve component programs and issues.
| /signed/ Terrence M. O’Connell Chairman |