Since its adoption in 1973, the Total Force Policy has guided decisions about how people available to the Department of Defense—active, Reserve component (RC), retired military, federal civilian, Service auxiliaries, and contractors—are structured to protect the nation’s interests. The integrated capabilities of the Total Force are essential to successfully implementing U.S. defense strategy and, indeed, are a prerequisite to a cost-effective force structure.

A quiet evolution has occurred within the Total Force since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Reserve components were structured to contain and, if necessary, defeat the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War era, the Reserve components now comprise a greater percentage of the Total Force and are essential partners in a wide range of military operations, from smaller-scale contingencies to major theater wars.

Guard and Reserve forces provide trained units and individuals to fight in wartime and to support the complete spectrum of DoD peacetime operations. Today, Reserve component forces are fully integrated into all war plans, and no major military operation can be successful without their participation.

Because of high operating and personnel tempo demands on the active component (AC), Reserve components are being called upon more frequently and for longer periods in peacetime than ever before. Since this trend is expected to continue, major changes to doctrine, training, education, and materiel are being made throughout the Department to ensure the rapid and seamless deployment of Reserve components.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that national leaders must have a wide range of viable options for promoting and protecting U.S. interests in peacetime, crisis, and war. The number and variety of potential military challenges require:

This force must be fully integrated to be successful in today’s resource-constrained climate. It must have the correct mix of capabilities between and within the Services, and among conventional, nuclear, and special operations forces. This joint force must also be able to shift quickly and efficiently from one type of operation to another.

The capabilities and strengths of each Service, including the U.S. Coast Guard, provide the foundation for planning and executing the National Military Strategy. These Service resources include a wide variety of capabilities for meeting national objectives. All elements of the Total Force must be able to work together smoothly. Success on the battlefield will depend on the operational and tactical synergy of fully integrated, agile Service forces. To meet the challenges of the future, the force also must be capable of evolving new capabilities through infusion of new technology, doctrine, operational concepts, training approaches, and organizational structures. This is particularly needed to enhance the ability of joint forces to operate in consonance with other U.S. government agencies, nongovernment organizations, international organizations, and private voluntary organizations in a variety of settings.

The ability of Reserve components to provide cost-effective military capability has influenced changes in the mix of active, Reserve component, and civilian forces. The Total Force increasingly will depend on the Reserve components to serve not only in their traditional wartime role, but also to provide a rotational base to ease operating and personnel tempo for a busy active component.

Force structure changes recommended by the QDR were based on a strategy that requires the United States to sustain the forces and capabilities needed to meet demands in the near term while beginning to transform the force for the future. Modest reductions in end strength and force structure are planned to achieve this goal. The enhanced capabilities of new systems and more efficient support structures will offset reduced end strength and force structure.

Planned FY 1999 capabilities are shown in Table 12.

Increased reliance on Guard and Reserve forces to meet critical operational requirements—in peacetime, crisis, and war—requires a corresponding commitment to improve the integration of Service forces.

Each Service uses Reserve component forces for a wide range of missions. For example, Army National Guard (ARNG) artillery brigades and Marine Corps combat battalions were used effectively in the Gulf War. Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and active troops also combined to form a battalion for peacekeeping efforts in the Sinai. ARNG support and infantry personnel are now serving in Macedonia as part of Task Force Able Sentry, and the total number of Army Reserve component members who have served in Bosnia over the course of operations so far exceeds 17,500. Air Reserve components provide tankers, transports, and fighters to support several different missions, including Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia. Naval and Marine Corps Reserves also provide air, ground, and sea support. Most Coast Guard Reservists serve in fully integrated units, reflecting the Team Coast Guard philosophy.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has expanded its reliance on Reserve component combat forces in roles beyond that of strategic reserve. RC contributions to the Sinai peacekeeping battalion and to Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia demonstrate that smaller Reserve combat units can be utilized effectively. The 15 ARNG enhanced Separate Brigades—which the Army is committed to having ready for combat within 90 days post-mobilization—are included in the regional commander in chief’s (CINC) war plans for both Korea and Southwest Asia. The Army is committed to implementing two integrated divisions comprised of both active and Army National Guard members.

National Guard divisions must continue to be prepared to contribute to several key missions, which include providing rear-area security in theater; backfilling in Europe and in ongoing smaller-scale contingency operations; supporting the rapid deployment of active units and the mobilization of the enhanced Separate Brigades; and supporting state missions. Under the Army’s division redesign program, up to 12 of the 42 ARNG maneuver brigades will be converted to meet shortfalls in combat support and combat service support units.

Achieving a seamless Total Force requires command emphasis on the principles of Total Force integration, as set forth in the September 4, 1997, Secretary of Defense policy memorandum. Progress towards Total Force integration depends on the ability of all military and civilian leaders to create an environment that eliminates residual barriers to integration—structural and cultural. Integration is defined as the conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership, at all levels, to have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force—within whatever timelines set up for the unit—in peace and war. To achieve joint integration, the following basic principles must be applied consistently:

Force planning processes have undergone review and modification to provide the National Command Authorities greater flexibility in the use of Reserve component units and members. The Reserve components have been slowly but increasingly accepted within DoD force planning organizations. Recent policy changes, which require that RC capabilities be tied to war plans and contingency plans across the total spectrum of national military requirements, will help further AC/RC integration.

The Department of Defense is reviewing its policies to provide for increased accessibility and flexibility in the use of Reserve component forces. Far from being limited to ensuring that Reservists are trained and available for call-up in times of emergency, DoD now asks Reservists to be available to support the full spectrum of military activities, including peacetime operations. Therefore, use of the Reserves today requires balancing the nation’s ongoing requirements with Reservists’ nonmilitary career and family demands.

The policy governing the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program has been revised to increase flexibility in the use of augmentees to support CINC, Defense Intelligence, and joint support functions. Training and pay category policies have been rewritten to provide additional flexibility in the use of training time and in the scheduling of training which supports active component missions.

All Services have made the transition to an integrated family readiness program, which supports both active and Reserve component families. (The Coast Guard also supports both active duty and Reserve members, and their families, through a common family support program.) Inter-Service Family Assistance Committees, automated networks, and professionally prepared guides and brochures help disseminate information about family support programs to the force.

Family support plans are now extensively coordinated at regional, state, or major command levels. Most Services use a combination of chain of command, staff assistance and inspection, mobilization exercises, and Joint Staff exercise support to evaluate the effectiveness of family readiness plans and programs. The Reserve components of the Army and Air Force also use active component inspections, Operational Readiness Evaluations (exercises and inspections), and Quality Air Force Assessments to evaluate their family support plans.

In conjunction with increased use of the RC, the Department is examining the compensation and benefits available for RC members to ensure fairness and parity with the active force. Primary areas being reviewed are:

Reserve components are planning to increase use of simulation, embedded training, and distance learning technologies. Through these technologies, the limited time available to train Selected Reservists—collectively in units and as individuals—can be made more productive. Recent reports on Reserve component training readiness indicate that approximately 20 percent of members are not qualified in their current assignments. DoD is pursuing the growing spectrum of distance learning media, in ways fully interoperable with existing DoD and government systems, to facilitate improved training readiness throughout the Department.

To foster integration, DoD is developing policies to emphasize education and experience in joint matters for Reserve officers not on the active-duty list. Such policies will, to the extent practicable for the Reserve components, be similar to the personnel management and professional military education (PME) policies established to enable active duty military officers to function more effectively in a joint environment.

During FY 1997, all joint positions occupied by Reserve component officers were identified and evaluated for the required level of joint professional military education. Approximately 1,100 of 4,400 Reserve officer positions require education beyond the traditional Phase I, intermediate, and senior PME levels. Several options are being considered, including a shorter version of the Armed Forces Staff College course and a revised National Defense University Reserve Forces National Security course.

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) leverages the talents of intelligence Reservists in direct support of national intelligence requirements. In 1997, the JRIP allocated over 34,000 man-days to these requirements; more are programmed for FY 1998. The JRIP can enhance individual readiness by providing intelligence Reservists opportunities to do in training what they will do upon mobilization or to learn national intelligence systems and skills by doing real world intelligence production. These Reservists often bring unique civilian/military mixes of skills, capabilities, and contacts that may be particularly useful, but not otherwise available to the national intelligence community.

Efforts are under way to ensure that Reserve component units are equipped with modern, compatible equipment that enables them to perform their missions side-by-side with active components and coalition partners.

In 1997, the Reserve components continued to benefit from several years of base realignment.

The realignments in 1997 enhanced the Reserve and active components’ ability to accomplish training and increase mission readiness. In addition, a well-managed annual construction program has yielded as many as 123 new facilities to accommodate Reserve component mission requirements. The Department seeks to take advantage of economies of scale by combining and co-locating active and reserve component facilities and operations whenever possible.

An integrated Total Force is the key to achieving the goals of shaping, responding, and preparing for the challenges and opportunities confronting the nation today and tomorrow. Using the concepts and principles of the National Military Strategy, the Concept for Future Joint Operations (Joint Vision 2010), and the Total Force Policy, the Department of Defense will continue the evolution towards a seamlessly integrated, cost-effective force.