[Table of Contents][Go Back to Previous][Advance to Next][Bottom of Page]

Appendix G
PERSONNEL READINESS FACTORS BY RACE AND GENDER

This appendix responds to the National Defense Authorization Act FY 1995 (Public Law 103-337, Section 533) which requires that the Department submit a report of readiness factors by race and gender as part of its annual report.

INDISCIPLINE TRENDS

DoD has been working to implement the Defense Incident Based Reporting System (DIBRS), a centralized data base of DoD criminal incidents. DoD issued directives in late 1996 requiring the Services and DoD components to implement DIBRS.

DIBRS incorporates the crime reporting requirements of the Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988, the Victims Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, and the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1994. DIBRS also requires the Services to report criminal incidents involving sexual harassment and race-bias motivated offenses.

DIBRS will produce automated reports of criminal activity and disciplinary infractions that include case dispositions in administrative, nonjudicial, court martial, and civilian court proceedings and discrimination and sexual harassment complaints.

The military departments began partial reporting of data to DIBRS in 1997. While substantial progress has been made, funding and other problems have prevented the Services from completely implementing DIBRS.

Military Complaint Trends

Since FY 1987, the Services have reported annually to DoD the number of resolved formal complaints of sexual harassment and all other discrimination (e.g., complaints based on race, sex, national origin, and religion) filed by military personnel. At the end of FY 1996, the number of formal complaints of sexual harassment and all other discrimination totaled 2,099, representing one complaint per thousand military personnel.

The percentage of confirmed sexual harassment complaints has remained above 50 percent since FY 1993. The percentage of all other discrimination complaints that have been confirmed has remained over 30 percent since FY 1993. Although not a direct comparison, these results are higher than the 12 percent confirmation rate for DoD equal employment opportunity complaints in FY 1993. While complaint confirmation rates may appear to be a positive sign, they are not clear-cut indicators of the effectiveness of Service military equal opportunity programs. Because several factors may lead to allegations of sexual harassment or discrimination (i.e., misperceptions, mismanagement, failures to communicate, etc.), complaints that were not confirmed may be indicative of other forms of organizational problems or morale issues. Service military equal opportunity programs are composed of several dimensions (e.g., formal and informal complaint systems, education and training, climate assessment, and affirmative action initiatives), which must be assessed collectively to rate program effectiveness.

Complaint trend data from FY 1987 through FY 1996 have been similar for both complaints of sexual harassment and all other discrimination.

Sexual Harassment Complaints

The total number of sexual harassment complaints began at 513 in FY 1987, fluctuated through FY 1996, but never fell below the starting figure. The number of sexual harassment complaints peaked at 1,599 in FY 1993. The percent of substantiated sexual harassment complaints reflects an upward trend from 38 percent in FY 1987 to a high of 59 percent in FY 1995s and 1996.

All Other Discrimination Complaints

The total number of all other discrimination complaints in FY 1987 was 513, and has fluctuated in the period through FY 1996, though never falling below the starting figure. The number of all other discrimination complaints peaked at 2,103 in FY 1992. The percent of all other discrimination complaints that were substantiated reflects an upward trend from 26 percent in FY 1987 to a high of 41 percent in FY 1995, with a reported decline to 31 percent in FY 1996.

NONDEPLOYABILITY TRENDS

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Services, has continued to review permanent and temporary limitations on the deployability of service members and to address the issue of nondeployability in relation to readiness. In general, when a unit deploys, the individuals assigned to that unit are expected to participate in that deployment; the overwhelming majority do, regardless of personal circumstances. However, it is inevitable that a temporary medical condition or a family emergency, for example, may temporarily prevent some members from accompanying their unit. Each problem is unique to the service member and to the circumstances of his/her unit and is properly managed at the unit level. Current Department policy recognizes Service-unique and unit-unique circumstances, and provides the Services with the flexibility to manage those situations to meet readiness goals. Accident, illness, and family emergencies are inherently unplanned and pose the greatest challenges to commanders of units about to deploy.

Nondeployability is measured in three permanent condition categories: HIV-positive, other Medical Permanent, and Hazardous Duty Restriction. The five temporary condition categories are AWOL/Deserter, Legal Processing, Pregnancy, Medical Temporary, and Administrative. A service member can be counted as nondeployable in one category only. Since the Services are given some latitude in determining who is or is not deployable based on certain conditions, a meaningful comparison between the Services in a number of categories is not always possible.

Permanent medical limitations (HIV-positive, cancer, heart disease, asthma, diabetes, and other progressive medical conditions) are a small part of the overall nondeployable population. The Department’s July 1997 Report to Congress on Permanent Medical Nondeployables provides some detailed analysis of this particular. The actual number of members with permanent limitations remains small—around three-tenths of 1 percent of the active force—and is far too small to exert a significant impact on readiness. This small number is manageable through the assignment process to minimize readiness impacts.

DoD’s focus in data collection has been to capture the nondeployability of unit personnel who directly contribute to unit readiness and whose availability for duty is controllable by a unit, installation, or senior local commander. Non-unit personnel (i.e., transients, trainees/students, long-term patients, prisoners, and personnel awaiting separation) are treated separately and not counted against readiness billets. Therefore, DoD does not include them in data reported here.

Tables G-23 to G-27 present the data for all of DoD and each of the Services as of the end of FY 1997. The nondeployable category totals and rates reflect only the quantities associated with service members assigned to units (i.e., that portion of each Service’s active end strength that is applied against the manpower requirements of their programmed force structure, also known as the operating strength).

Retention Rates

The Department of Defense has been able to maintain the overall retention rates while preserving a quality force despite personnel turbulence reflected in the past years. These achievements can be attributed to the skillful execution and management of Services’ programmed retention strategies.

Each Service’s retention rates have been somewhat consistent for FY 1995, FY 1996, and FY 1997. The rates may have increased or decreased from one year to the next by a small margin, but there are no significant increases or decreases in the numbers. After years of focusing on drawing down the force, the Services have refocused on retention of the right number of quality people to retain to successfully meet Service missions well into the next century.

Retention of quality personnel in sufficient numbers to meet Service requirements remains a top priority. DoD has improved the quality of the force and its readiness while maintaining the commitment to treat people equal and fair. Today the nation has a force that is smarter, more experienced, and more diverse. This ensures that the country’s best people, regardless of gender, are continuously encouraged to remain in the force.

In summary, the Department continues to improve the quality of U.S. forces and its readiness while maintaining its commitment to treat people fairly. The Department of Defense is pleased with the success attained this year and is ready to meet upcoming retention challenges.

First-Term Reenlistment Rates

The overall first-term reenlistment rate has been declining. The Army’s first term reenlistments have increased from FY 1996. The Marine Corps is somewhat stable, given the fact that it only has a set number of slots available for reenlistments. The Navy and Air Force have shown a decrease each year. The decrease is believed in part to be due to a number of influencers, i.e. erosion of benefits, strong economy, family separation, quality of life, and career instability.

Overall, reenlistment indicators are stable at the macro, but the Services are monitoring micro indicators closely. Each Service is experiencing pockets of retention difficulties and is addressing the causes.

TRENDS IN PROPENSITY TO ENLIST

Since 1975, the Department of Defense annually has conducted the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS), a computer-assisted telephone interview of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 young men and women. This survey provides information on the propensity, attitudes, and motivations of young people toward military service. Enlistment propensity is the percentage of youth who state they definitely or probably plan to be serving on active duty in one of the Services in the next few years. Research has shown that the expressed intentions of young men and women are strong predictors of enlistment behavior.

Enlistment Propensity Trends

Results from the 1997 YATS show that, overall, young men’s propensity for military service has not changed significantly in the last three years (see table G-18). In 1997, 26 percent of 16-21 year-old men expressed propensity for at least one active-duty Service, about the same as in 1996 (27 percent) and 1995 (28 percent). Propensity for each of the Services also remained about the same in 1997 as in 1995 and 1996.

However, the propensity of young Hispanic men dropped significantly, from 44 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 1997. Following the Cold War, young black men’s propensity dropped from 54 percent in 1989 to the 32 in 1994. White men’s propensity also dropped, from 26 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in 1994. Neither propensity of black nor white young men has changed significantly since 1994. Until the current year, Hispanic men’s propensity declined only slightly from Cold War levels.

Propensity of 16-21 year-old women also declined significantly, from 14 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 1997. In the previous 5-year period, as career opportunities in the Services opened to women and more women enlisted, women’s propensity had increased gradually, from 12 percent in 1992 to 14 percent in 1996. The 1997 drop, returning women’s propensity to 1992 levels, is consistent across all four Services. The 1997 drop in young women’s propensity crosses racial and ethnic lines; for whites, blacks, and hispanics, 1997 propensity statistics are roughly four-fifths of 1996 figures.

To downsize the military following the Cold War, the Services reduced their accession objectives below the levels required to replace those leaving military service. Although the post-Cold War decline in young men’s propensity was troubling, nevertheless sufficient numbers of men enlisted to allow the Services to meet reduced recruiting goals. Now, as force drawdown objectives are met, recruiting missions are rising to levels required to replace those leaving service. Current YATS results indicate the supply of young men and women with a propensity for military service, relative to accession requirements, is less than before the end of the Cold War. Thus, recruiting high quality youth into the armed forces will continue to be a challenge.

Factors Influencing Propensity

Regardless of their propensity for military service, YATS respondents are asked to provide, in their own words, reasons for joining and not joining the military. The most frequently mentioned reasons for joining are money for college, job training and/or experience, duty to country, pay, travel, and self-discipline.

Most young men and women see postsecondary education as the key to prosperity and job security. The percent of youth going to college is increasing, and YATS results show that young people are aware that the military offers money for a college education. Educational funding is the most frequently cited reason for enlisting, and the percent of youth mentioning education funding is growing. In 1997, 32 percent of men and 36 percent of women identified money for college as a reason for joining; comparable 1991 figures were 24 percent of men and 31 percent of women. Extended in-depth interviews with selected YATS respondents suggest that, for affluent youth, acquiring funding for college was never a concern, and military service was never a consideration. In fact, analysis of YATS data shows youth most likely to go to college have below-average propensity but are most likely to cite educational funding as a reason for joining. Nonetheless, many young people have the will and the talent for college, but lack the funds. The Montgomery GI Bill, the Army/Navy/Marine Corps College Funds, the Service academies, and Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship programs provide the Services with an effective means of attracting these talented young men and women to the military, and provide these youth the means to gain a college education.

For many noncollege youth, military service offers an opportunity for job experience and specialized training. In 1997, 25 percent of men, and 17 percent of women mentioned job training and experience as a reason for entering military service. Other reasons for joining are mentioned much less frequently. In 1997, pay was mentioned by 12 percent of men and 10 percent of women; duty to country was mentioned by 11 percent of men and 9 percent of women; travel by 8 percent of men, 6 percent of women, and discipline by 6 percent of men, 4 percent of women. The percentages of men and women mentioning job training, pay, duty to country, travel, and discipline as reasons for joining have not changed significantly in the past few years.

The most frequently cited reason for not entering military service concerns military lifestyle, mentioned by 17 percent of men and 22 percent of women in 1997. Military service evokes images of discipline and regimentation for most young men, regardless of current or past propensity. These images tend to deter many college-bound youth from interest in the military. Young people believe they have the self-discipline to achieve their goals and see regimentation as stifling. Others, however, see externally imposed discipline as beneficial. Following the 1995 YATS, DoD conducted extended interviews with young men who seemed likely to enter military service. Some noted that learning discipline served an important maturing role in their lives; others look forward to learning this critical life lesson in military service. The military would provide a guiding structure within which to get their priorities straight. It is ironic that the reason most frequently cited for not entering military service might, for many, be the primary motivation for enlisting.

Other reasons for not entering military service suggest, not rejection of the military, but commitment to an alternative. In 1997, 10 percent of men and 7 percent of women mentioned other career interests as a reason for not joining. Seven percent of men and 14 of women mentioned family obligations; many enlistment-age youth feel they are not able to enlist because they are needed to care for ailing parents or for their own families. Some youth (9 percent of men; 8 percent of women) suggested the length of commitment to the military is too long. While some military service might be beneficial, it does not offset deferring other career or education plans for 4 years. Finally, about 9 percent of men and 6 percent of women cite danger as a reason for not entering military service; 6 percent of men and 4 percent of women stated military service was against their beliefs.

Relative to whites and Hispanics, young black men and women are more likely to mention pay as a reason for joining, and less likely to mention educational funding or duty to country. As reasons for not entering military service, white men and women are more likely to mention other career interests, or to object to the length of commitment, perhaps because they have more career opportunities than minority men and women. Finally, familial obligations are mentioned as an obstacle to military service more frequently by women (compared to men) and Hispanics (compared to whites and blacks).

YATS respondents are also asked whether their interest in military service has increased or decreased and, if so, why it has increased or decreased. These questions elicit much of the same information described above. Educational funding and job training are the most common reasons for increased interest. Going to school and other career plans are the most common reasons for decreased interest. These questions, however, also point to the role of influencers (e.g., parents, friends) as a factor affecting propensity for military service. In 1997, 11 percent of young men and 13 percent of young women cited conversations with military members or veterans as a reason for increased interest. Ten percent of both men and women whose interest had decreased cited conversations with military members or veterans as a reason for decreased interest. Among both those whose interest had increased and those whose interest had decreased, conversations with military members (other than recruiters) and veterans were more frequently mentioned than recruiter contact and recruiting advertising combined. Over 4 out of 5 young people know someone who is, or has been, in the military, and conversations with military members and veterans influence propensity to enlist. Fortunately, the evidence shows veterans’ influence is more often positive than negative.

CONCLUSION

Both men’s and women’s propensity remain substantially below pre-drawdown levels and, if past experience is a guide, below the levels needed to meet increased accession requirements while maintaining the high quality required for today’s military. These findings underscore the need for college funds to attract an important segment of college-bound youth (those needing money). Many other youth, however, are attracted by the prospects of job training and experience, and by the discipline universally viewed as intrinsic to military service. To meet recruiting goals, DoD must address the needs of all market segments.

Most young people know someone who is, or has been, in the military. Propensity for military service is strongly influenced by what these people say, and how they behave. It will continue to be important for Department of Defense leaders to ensure that the people currently in the military not only believe they are fairly treated, but also derive pride and satisfaction from their experiences. Veterans who have served will always be a powerful influence on the attitudes and perceptions of potential recruits.

Table G-1 to G-2(Equal Opportunity Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Complaints)
Table G-3First Term-Reenlistment Rates
Table G-4 to G-6(Army Retention Trends)
Table G-7 to G-9(Navy Retention Trends)
Table G-10 to G-12(Marine Corps Retention Trends)
Table G-13 to G-15(Air Force Retention Trends)
Table G-16 to G-18(Coast Guard Retention Trends)
Table G-19(Total DoD Retention Trends)
Table G-20 to G-22(Trends in Enlistment Propensity)
Table G-23 to G-32(Nondeployable Unit Personnel)

 

[Table of Contents][Go Back to Previous][Advance to Next][Top of Page]