Chapter 4
READINESS
The diverse demands of the post-Cold War world require that the United States maintain highly capable forces prepared to rapidly respond to any contingency. Achieving this goal is one of the Department's most aggressive and ambitious undertakings. It is also the most important. Maintaining the readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces is the number one priority of the Department of Defense.
AMERICA'S FORCE IS READY
The Department has kept America's military ready while adjusting to the end of the Cold War. Keeping the military fully ready during a major drawdown is an unprecedented achievement. In each previous drawdown -- after the Second World War, Korea, and Vietnam -- forces went hollow as resources were eliminated faster than force structure. The Department was and is determined to avoid those errors of the past. As General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:
It is particularly notable that America did not stand down its forces to achieve this readiness. Indeed, American forces maintained a high operational tempo, yet kept readiness high while reducing the force.
America's military is ready for the next war, not just the last. During the Cold War, the requirements for readiness were clear -- be prepared to repulse an invasion of Western Europe, and should that fail, to escalate the conflict globally. Today, America's forces face a wide array of challenges, from civil strife through conventional combat to the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Potential opponents are more diverse and better armed than before. America's forces are equally diverse in their equipment and training, ready to meet any threat by land, sea, or air.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND READINESS
America's leadership in world affairs relies on ready military forces. Because
U.S. forces are organized and trained to support the National Security Strategy,
they must be prepared for, and on occasion must engage in, operations that
support the full spectrum of national interests:
Forces must meet standards in terms of the:
Keeping American forces ready to fight requires an appropriate force structure, modern equipment, maintenance and logistics support, and trained and motivated personnel. A deficiency in any of these elements can hurt readiness, inhibiting the deployment of forces. In managing readiness, the Department strives to maintain a balance among these crucial elements to ensure that forces arrive on time and fully capable to meet mission demands.
READINESS CHALLENGES
It takes resources and time to develop and sustain ready forces. Readiness is cumulative. It takes 20 years to develop senior military leaders, more than 10 years to build modern infrastructure, five to 10 years to develop and field technologically superior equipment, and one to two years to develop a sustainment program to provide trained and ready units. A decline in material resources or adequately trained people will lengthen the amount of time it takes to rebuild readiness.
Achieving and maintaining DoD readiness goals in today's dynamic political, fiscal, and operating environments present a daily challenge to the Department. Challenges to maintaining readiness emanate primarily from six variables: personnel, equipment, education and training, logistics, leadership development, and the financial resources to support these elements. A deficit in any one will degrade readiness. The following discussion characterizes these challenges and describes how the Department is addressing these issues.
CHALLENGE: KEEPING U.S. FORCES READY
In recent years, contingency operations have posed significant challenges to keeping readiness in balance. Forces have been committed to operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Korea, Rwanda, Southwest Asia, Haiti, Cuba, Peru, Ecuador, and the United States in a wide array of missions ranging from deterrence to natural disaster relief. At the same time U.S. forces have been engaged in support of the full spectrum of national interests, the United States has sustained its readiness to counter major regional threats.
To achieve its number one resource priority, DoD has focused on the lessons learned from hollow force periods of the 1970s and early 1980s and has taken deliberate steps to prevent a recurrence. Previous incidences of force hollowness reflected a force that was, on average, less educated, not as well trained, more poorly equipped, inadequately sustained, and less strategically mobile. In contrast, today's forces are the best ever fielded. U.S. military forces are well educated, receive quality training, and employ technologically superior equipment. The quality and capability of today's forces are the payoff from implementing lessons learned in previous periods of hollowness.
Keeping Current Readiness Current
Monitoring and assessing current readiness are both critical functions of the Department and among its toughest tasks. In an unpredictable world, American forces must be able to adapt and respond to a wide spectrum of military and political circumstances.
Further, the complexity of the Department requires readiness be measured empirically. It is not possible to predict readiness far in advance; commanders must be able to monitor and assess readiness in response to real-time events. This ability to react to ongoing world events is essential for good decisions regarding the use of force.
The Department employs or has in development seven major strategies to monitor,
assess, and manage current readiness:
Senior Readiness Oversight Council
The SROC provides the Department's senior leaders a collaborative forum to review significant readiness topics on a monthly basis. The SROC is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense; its membership includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of the military departments, and key DoD civilian leaders.
Learning From History: The Readiness Baseline
The Department is developing a comprehensive framework of readiness indicators to provide a view of current readiness in the context of historical readiness trends. These indicators will be measured against their historical trends to provide warnings of potential shortfalls. As this system matures, it will be used to assess current readiness, to synchronize readiness related budget data, and to support public discussion of the armed forces' readiness posture. The General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Readiness Task Force have all noted the desirability of identifying such indicators.
Automated Readiness Assessment Systems
A wealth of readiness data exists throughout the Department. From unit status reports to commander in chief (CINC) evaluations, the military routinely collects, evaluates, and analyzes readiness data at many levels of detail. In the past, there has been no automated networking capability to extract and manipulate relevant data and provide an overarching readiness picture to senior leaders. Now, though, existing readiness related systems are being evaluated in the field and enhanced with today's technology. While this effort requires further work, some promising systems are already under development.
Improving the Quality of Existing Readiness Data
For decision makers to monitor near-term readiness of the forces and determine whether resources are allocated appropriately, readiness assessment tools must address the appropriate allocation of resources to critical assets. Currently, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) is the principal means by which units around the world report their readiness to Service and joint headquarters. While each Service implements SORTS differently, the result is a complete picture of readiness, detailed down to the sub-unit level. By looking at recurring SORTS data, decision makers can determine whether sufficient assets are allocated to personnel, equipment, supplies, or training.
To enhance the ability of SORTS to provide accurate data on current readiness, the Department has undertaken a SORTS reform and enhancement process. Many parts of the SORTS system are antiquated. A recent report by the DoD Inspector General stated, "Decision makers cannot rely on SORTS data for decisions because of problems related to accuracy, timeliness, and relevancy." The Department is currently evaluating changes to SORTS that would remedy known shortcomings and make readiness data available in a much more timely fashion. DoD is also evaluating ways to make the system more flexible, more responsive, more reliable, and easier to use. In addition to providing improved information for decision makers, upgrading the quality of data improves the Department's ability to respond accurately to public concerns about readiness.
Joint Mission Essential Task Lists as Performance Standards
The basic building block of unit readiness is the ability to perform the specific tasks and missions required in a wartime scenario. To evaluate the readiness of individual units, the Department must consider what the units need to be ready to do in a wartime environment. To measure an organization's ability to perform specific joint tasks, the CINCs have developed Joint Mission Essential Task Lists for all missions.
By the end of FY 1998, the Services will link the Component Command Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) with the Joint Training System-approved JMETLs, and incorporate the JMETLs as the source for guiding Service unit training. Integrating JMETLs into the readiness assessment process will give decision makers standards of performance against which individual unit capability can be measured.
This project does not change the missions that the CINCs are expected to perform. Instead, it specifies the tasks in sufficient level of detail to allow staffs and units to train and fully develop the necessary level of both unit and joint readiness. This ongoing process focuses on train-like-you-fight activities and will enhance joint training and exercises. It will eventually provide a basis to measure readiness in terms of output (readiness to accomplish the specified mission) rather than today's input-oriented (readiness to perform as intended by the unit design) processes.
Measure and Balance the Deployment Load on Military Personnel
One cannot understand readiness without the ability to assess the capability of military personnel to perform. As participation in contingency operations becomes standard, units and personnel are increasingly deployed for extended periods on a recurring basis. These deployments have numerous effects on readiness. For example, because units deployed to contingency or humanitarian operations do not always use wartime skills, combat training may be degraded. Extended deployments adversely affect morale and quality of life for the deployed personnel. This can affect both mission performance and retention rates.
The Department has undertaken several initiatives to monitor and assess the effects of personnel deployments. First, under the auspices of the SROC, the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) conducted a study of the levels of Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) and determined which units and skills were reaching levels at which readiness would be affected. Results of this study allowed the military Services to take action in their programs to offset excessive PERSTEMPO.
A second effort, the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP), establishes a protocol for worldwide use of highly tasked units. These units, such as the Airborne Warning and Control Systems, are normally few in the force structure (low density, or LD) yet are called upon to support almost all contingency operations (high demand, or HD). The aggregation of multiple CINC missions led to excessive deployments of many of these HD/LD units. The GMFP establishes deployment thresholds for these units and sets the Secretary of Defense as the approval authority for deployments in excess of the threshold. The policy allows optimal use of the units across all CINCs, while precluding overuse of selected units.
Reduce the Impact of Contingencies on Readiness Funding
The fiscal effect of unbudgeted contingency operations on O&M accounts constitutes a major challenge to readiness. The Department's approach to overcoming that hazard is described in detail below
CHALLENGE: READINESS FUNDING
The second challenge is to make sure the Department has the right resources allocated to the right purposes in support of readiness. Many assumptions on funding become inaccurate due to shifting priorities and the lengthy budget and execution cycle. Structuring the budget to ensure readiness involves a rigorous, multistep process. For the FY 1998 budget request sent to Congress, this process began over a year ago with Secretary Perry's guidance to the Services and other defense components. The Secretary directed the Services to provide enough funding in future programs and budgets to ensure their forces were ready to carry out missions at acceptable levels of risk. Underscoring the strength of this priority, the Secretary allowed the Services to break his guidance elsewhere if required to maintain readiness.
The results of DoD's approach to getting readiness funding right from the start were incorporated into the FY 1995 budget, which involved many changes from the previous year and corrected some unrealistic assumptions. The FY 1996 and 1997 budgets also reflected robust readiness funding. The Department's FY 1998 budget request offers further refinements in readiness, building on progress made in the previous fiscal years. For example, levels of funding for operations and maintenance -- the major, but not sole, source of readiness funding -- indicate DoD has maintained historic levels of readiness.
In light of the improvements made, the Department's budgets are balanced and realistic. Indeed, the funding provided in the FY 1998 budget will maintain adequate readiness levels in the Services, with one important provision -- the Department must receive timely funding for unbudgeted contingency operations.
Strategies for Funding Contingency Operations
By their very nature, contingency operations are unforeseen. The Department is thus unable to program or budget for these operations. When the contingency occurs, the Department must fund the operation by reallocating other funds. The impact of ongoing contingencies on the budget is large.
The total contingency operations costs of $3.2 billion represented approximately 1.3 percent of the total $252 billion FY 1996 defense budget. Contingency costs normally occur within the operation and maintenance appropriations and must be absorbed unless they can be offset from investment appropriations (procurement and research and development) via a reprogramming action which requires prior approval by Congress before funds may be realigned. Since most of the military personnel and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations, comprising nearly 63 percent of the defense budget, are used to support day-to-day fact-of-life requirements and maintain high readiness postures, investment accounts are the most likely source of funds to be reprogrammed to support contingency operations.
Another dimension of the problem with funding contingencies is the timing of the operations; the later an operation occurs during the fiscal year, the less flexibility the Department has in reprogramming. The bottom line of the funding reality is that contingencies can kill readiness. By the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, the only places from which funds can be diverted are the readiness accounts that support training and maintenance.
Additionally, funding of contingencies from O&M budgets can delay training or maintenance schedules and result in lost opportunities. The key resource lost while waiting for supplemental funding is time. Dollars arriving late in the fiscal year cannot buy back six months of missed range training or put a delayed maintenance program back on track quickly.
The Department's challenge, then, has been to develop mechanisms to provide alternative funding sources without damaging the readiness accounts. In the past, DoD has relied on supplemental appropriations from Congress to fund contingencies. As the 1994 readiness crisis in the Army proved, this method will not prevent readiness shortfalls. Thus, in a fundamental policy change, the Department has now taken the approach of funding contingency operations on an ongoing basis from within the current program. Alternatives to provide this funding as part of the overall O&M accounts are being developed by the Department.
Assessment of Readiness Funding
The resources in the FY 1998 budget will provide adequate readiness for America's
armed forces, provided that:
For the outyears of the program beyond FY 1998, DoD plans to focus on maintaining adequate readiness, specifically the elements of readiness critical to the execution of U.S. defense strategy. DoD has fully funded operating and personnel programs. At the same time, there may be significant risks to readiness as DoD plans are executed. For example, some programs in the O&M appropriations may eventually need more funds. DoD must take care to ensure that reallocating funds for these purposes does not unduly divert resources away from more direct readiness needs. The Department must also maintain a balance between current readiness and required increases in procurement and modernization funding in future budgets.
FY 1998-2003 Programs and Budgets
Despite the challenges in precisely projecting U.S. readiness and sustainability needs in uncertain times, the readiness programs and budgets being submitted to Congress represent the best estimate within DoD today of the resources necessary to keep U.S. military forces ready to execute the U.S. National Security Strategy successfully.
Future programs and budgets were developed using the direction provided through
prior years' planning. The principal guidance affecting readiness follows:
Modernization/Long-Term Capability
Technologically superior equipment facilitates combat success. Recognizing
the need to maintain the technological superiority of U.S. forces, the Future
Years Defense Program provides procurement funding in FY 2003 nearly 30 percent
higher than requested in the FY 1997 budget. The principal opportunities
for meeting the United States' long-term goals lie in four areas:
The Department of Defense must maximize its efforts in these areas and continue to make prudent investments in recapitalization if it is to ensure that tomorrow's readiness is equal to tomorrow's challenges.
CHALLENGE: STAYING ON TOP OF READINESS
In last year's report, the Department described a series of initiatives to improve the ability to assess readiness and make ongoing corrections. These actions have proven their worth in the past year.
Senior Readiness Oversight Council
At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of the readiness of their respective units. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents a Joint Readiness assessment, as well as an overall assessment of the readiness of the armed forces to fight and execute the National Military Strategy. The joint readiness assessment is developed through the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This assessment provides a tool for determining whether near-term reallocation of resources is required to maintain readiness. The Department now submits a Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress providing a synopsis of the readiness status reviewed in the SROC meetings.
Chairman's Readiness System/Joint Monthly Readiness Review
Chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JMRR includes the principals of the Joint Staff directorates, the Service deputy chiefs of staff for operations, and representatives from the unified commands and combat support agencies. It is designed to examine the readiness of the armed forces to carry out the National Military Strategy, for which the Chairman has overarching responsibility. His view of readiness, therefore, requires visibility into the CINCs' ability to integrate and synchronize Service-provided forces by assessing joint readiness, as well as traditional readiness status of units provided by the Services.
Created in conjunction with the SROC, the JMRR assesses the readiness of the overall military force across geographic regions vital to national interests. Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective, evaluating the readiness of individual units of the Services to carry out their designed missions. The JMRR process provides a joint perspective beyond simple aggregation of individual unit readiness, by focusing on the requirements of the unified commanders to conduct joint operations with Service provided assets. Readiness issues of the unified commands are key, and the ability of the four Services and DoD combat support agencies (CSAs) is assessed by how well they meet current and expected taskings. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the unified CINCs plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use the forces provided from the Services and assets from the five CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives.
The JMRR process provides the Department an assessment of the military's current readiness to execute the full range of the National Military Strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and winning the nation's wars. JMRR reports assess current and projected readiness over the next 12 months.
The JMRR is conducted on a quarterly cycle. The Full JMRR, the most extensive review, is conducted in January, April, July, and October. It assesses deficiencies in current readiness, readiness projected one year in the future, and major regional and lesser regional contingency scenarios designed to stress current force structure. Current and projected readiness assessments provide unified CINCs the opportunity to address deficiencies caused by real-world regional environments. The scenarios change quarterly to explore a full range of possible conflict combinations.
During JMRR meetings, the Services report on their ability to provide component command forces to meet CINC requirements. Those reports are broken down by major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show the status of unit resources and training, which units are currently engaged in ongoing operations, and which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness -- people, equipment, and training -- and reports on the readiness of joint enablers, items like mobility and intelligence assets. During the second and third months of the cycle, By-Exception JMRRs are held to highlight significant readiness changes that may have occurred since the Full JMRR. The Feedback JMRR is conducted in the third month of the cycle to review actions taken to remedy issues identified in previous JMRRs.
The review has directly enhanced the Chairman's ability to provide accurate advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on the use of force, current and projected unit and joint readiness, current force commitments, and how those commitments impact the flow of forces to warfighting commanders. Furthermore, the review's swift evolution has provided the Senior Readiness Oversight Council an essential evaluative tool for assessing both unit and joint readiness.
CINC, Service, and CSA readiness assessments provided to the council show that, overall, the readiness of military units today is holding steady where levels are already as desired, and getting better where improvements are needed. The Department can carry out the strategy for prosecuting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts at today's readiness levels.
Joint Requirements Oversight Council
Chaired by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with functions delegated to the Vice Chairman, this council includes the Vice Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. It is supported by Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams that examine key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness.
The assessments examine both the readiness of U.S. forces and their future
ability to execute the defense strategy in key mission areas, such as ground
maneuver, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, and deep strike. Some
of the JROC's activities include:
Joint Readiness Assessment
The evolving emphasis on the joint task force requires CINCs to dispatch joint force packages to meet a wide variety of missions on very short notice. In preparing to employ troops on contingency operations, the CINCs have noted they lack an effective mechanism for assessing the joint readiness of the forces assigned to them. While each Service has its own system to assess readiness, there are clear differences in how each Service prepares its respective forces and assesses their suitability for deployment. However, this training does not evaluate the joint capabilities required by deployed forces in the event of emergent contingency operations. The Department is engaged in a number of efforts to define and develop systems to report and evaluate joint readiness.
Service Readiness Updates
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness meets regularly with Service representatives to receive in-depth readiness assessments of their forces. The briefings cover current readiness of units, highlight deficiencies, outline solutions, discuss new initiatives, and provide a forum to discuss overall Service and joint readiness issues. These proactive meetings provide further insight into tracking and assessing the current and future readiness of U.S. forces.
Measurements of Readiness
The Department's greatest challenge is to continue to maintain a high level of readiness. To meet this challenge, DoD has initiated development of mechanisms to monitor and assess current readiness, and to estimate the resources required to preserve future readiness.
Estimating Readiness Requirements Against Projected Threats
Predicting the warfighting demand for joint readiness is a critical part of evaluating readiness of forces to accomplish their future wartime missions. DoD is developing methods to estimate the readiness requirements of units as a function of the set of ongoing missions, the size and modernization of anticipated threat forces, and the joint warfighting capability required for each warfighting mission. With readiness requirements in hand, the Department can allocate resources appropriately.
TRAINING AND EDUCATING READY FORCES
The key to ensuring a trained, ready force in the future is to develop ways to train the force in more efficient and less costly ways. To that end, the Department is examining both technological improvements in the training process and outsourcing and privatization efforts projected to provide lower cost of training and education. The Department continues to build upon the Commission on Roles and Missions study that recommended more outsourcing of training and education to provide better individual training at significantly less cost. Efforts include using the private sector to accelerate the applications of advanced learning technology, and distance learning to produce more efficient and effective training.
Simulation Training
Providing realistic joint training across all phases of military operations for all types of missions remains a formidable challenge. Recognizing the need for more such training, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services are coordinating their efforts to create a coherent integrated plan for the use of modeling and simulation in support of joint and interservice training.
The Executive Council for Modeling and Simulation established a Training
Council for Modeling and Simulation, chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Readiness and the Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans
and Interoperability. The primary objective of this council is to develop
and implement joint/interservice training simulation plans that represent
the needs and interests of the training community. This effort:
A major focus of the Training Council is the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) program. In development for a 1999 introduction, the JSIMS program represents a quantum leap over existing training technology. It will encompass the full range of missions across all phases of military operations. JSIMS will provide better simulations for joint training across the force by using efficient, composable simulations tailored to meet training needs. It will share a common architecture with other training simulations, as well as analytical and acquisition related models. Finally, it will interface with actual command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) functions and equipment in the field. DoD has established a joint program office for management of JSIMS and is in the process of providing staffing from each Service. A new program element has been established for the core JSIMS developments and efforts are underway to coordinate related Service activities.
The Department has made a priority of exploiting enhanced modeling and simulation through distributive technology. The Department's policy for joint readiness includes proactive application of simulation technologies in the areas of joint training, exercises, and readiness monitoring. The coordinated use of simulation and C4I systems design will allow for the distribution of training support while reducing training costs. The DoD Modeling and Simulation Master Plan is being amended with a definitive description of the requirements, plans, and programs to support joint and interservice training. In addition, DoD is pursuing development of better modeling methods to improve U.S. capability to predict the interaction of forces and reduce the fog and friction of war. This coordinated effort will increase efficiency and interoperability, as well as improve cost efficiency, through more efficient utilization of the simulation technology.
MEDICAL READINESS
Medical readiness is the cornerstone of the Military Health Services System (MHSS). It encompasses the ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain medical services; to maintain and project the continuum of health care resources required to provide for the health of the force; and to operate in conjunction with beneficiary health care mission. The MHSS supports the full array of military missions, including major regional contingencies, lesser contingencies, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
Key to medical readiness is the experience acquired through real-world operational support missions. During the past year, the Department provided medical support to numerous peacekeeping and humanitarian operations around the world. In Operation Joint Endeavor -- the largest deployment of medical forces since the Gulf War -- the Department provided medical support to the operation in Bosnia. In Operation Assured Response, the Department provided medical support to noncombatant evacuation operations in Liberia. In Operation Fair Winds in Haiti, medical personnel supported humanitarian and nation-building efforts. Also, in Operation Desert Focus, the MHSS returned military dependents to the United States and consolidated U.S. forces for forward deployment in Saudi Arabia. Domestically, medical readiness was enhanced by a combination of operational missions to include medical support for natural disasters and for the 11,000 military personnel supporting the Atlanta Olympics. In addition, CINCs and Services conduct exercises, providing additional opportunity for medical personnel to hone their wartime skills in a realistic environment through employment combat equipment and systems.
The Department continues to update its Medical Readiness Strategic Plan 2001 (MRSP 2001). The MRSP helps identify readiness and resources requirements and develop medical policies and procedures. It also establishes objectives to measure medical readiness. This document, published in March 1995, provides the Department with an integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plan for achieving and sustaining medical readiness through 2001 and beyond. Its vision addresses nine functional areas: Planning; Requirements, Capabilities and Assessments; Command, Control, Communications and Computers and Information Management; Logistics; Medical Evacuation; Manpower and Personnel; Training; Blood Programs; and Readiness Oversight. As new functional areas, objectives, and action plans are identified, they will be added to improve overall medical readiness posture. To date, four additional functional areas -- Military Operations Other Than War; Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense; Medical Research and Development; and Preventive Medicine -- have been identified and will be incorporated into the MRSP.
CONCLUSION
DoD continuously faces new challenges to readiness as the world changes. Past experiences, America's vigorous responses to them, and the valuable lessons derived show that U.S. forces today are ready to fight -- ready to get where they are needed, on time, to carry out the nation's tasks.
The challenge of measuring and maintaining readiness is a tough one. The world is unpredictable, so U.S. forces must be able to adapt and respond to a wide spectrum of military and political demands. It is not possible to develop a fully accurate long-range predictive model of readiness; DoD must be able to monitor and assess readiness in response to real-time events. Tools such as the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, the Readiness Baseline, the automated readiness assessment systems, SORTS enhancement, the Joint Mission Essential Task List performance standards, Personnel Tempo oversight, and the creation of alternative funding strategies will provide a firm foundation for the task of monitoring and assessing near term readiness. Similarly, reducing maintenance backlogs and enhancing training will provide the nation a trained, ready force at a lower cost.
For FY 1998 and beyond, the Department will maintain the readiness of its forces to carry out the National Security Strategy. The policies and programs enumerated in this chapter demonstrate the continued initiative and energy with which the Department is addressing these challenges and will set the stage for ensuring readiness for the future. Such efforts rest with the shared responsibility between Congress and the Department. With these initiatives, and particularly with timely funding for contingency operations, the United States will continue in the future to have the world's best trained, best equipped force run by the world's best men and women.