Chapter 2
U.S. FORCES
The United States' strategy of engagement and enlargement requires forces that are able, in concert with regional allies, to fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. This requirement, established in the Bottom-Up Review, has been the most significant factor in determining the overall size and structure of U.S. conventional forces. U.S. forces must also be capable of meeting a wide range of other challenges, including sustaining credible overseas presence, remaining prepared to conduct contingency operations, and maintaining strong nuclear deterrence, as well as deterring and preventing the effective use of biological and chemical weapons. To meet these challenges effectively, U.S. forces must be positioned forward or ready to deploy rapidly to distant regions to achieve their objectives quickly and decisively.
MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS
During the Cold War, U.S. defense planning focused on winning a large-scale war in Europe. With the changes in the global security environment, the United States today must plan for the more likely scenario of fighting and winning potential regional conflicts on the scale of the 1991 Gulf War or a conflict in Korea. In contrast to the Cold War, the timing and location of these regional conflicts are uncertain, and the bulk of required U.S. forces may not be in theater prior to the outbreak of conflict. Even in areas of great U.S. interest and high threat, where some equipment is prepositioned and troops are forward deployed, most U.S. forces will deploy from the United States. U.S. defense plans therefore must ensure selected forces can quickly project power from their forward deployed locations and from the United States into threatened regions to secure U.S. interests and help allies defeat hostile regional powers. Moreover, the sustainment of U.S. power projection forces -- in the absence of a large, forward-stationed logistics structure -- will require the development and employment of new logistics technologies.
Often in these major regional conflicts, the United States will fight as the leader of a coalition, with allies and friends providing some support and combat forces. DoD expects that regional allies will fight along with U.S. forces, and that friends and allies from beyond the crisis area will contribute forces to any major regional conflict. However, U.S. forces must be sized and structured to preserve the flexibility and the capability to act unilaterally if necessary. Detailed analysis of the force capabilities required to fight and win possible future major regional conflicts is being conducted in support of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE
A second broad class of military operations that determine the overall size and shape of U.S. forces is overseas presence. Although all Services contribute substantially to a U.S. overseas presence posture, overseas presence needs impose requirements for naval forces that exceed those needed for major regional conflicts alone. Therefore, programmed force levels for the Navy were developed based on overseas presence missions as well as requirements for two major regional conflicts.
The United States will continue to maintain a robust overseas presence in
several forms:
Stationing and deploying U.S. military forces overseas in peacetime remain essential elements of the United States' National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The U.S. military's peacetime overseas presence is the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in key regions throughout the world. The presence of U.S. forces helps shape the international security environment by helping deter adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassuring friends, furthering influence and access, enhancing regional stability, and underwriting the larger strategy of engagement and enlargement. It thus strengthens the U.S. role in the affairs of key regions, such as Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
Maintaining a sufficient level of U.S. military forces in Europe is essential to preserving U.S. influence and leadership. The reassurance that a visible and capable U.S. military presence provides both to America's traditional allies in Western Europe and to its new Partners for Peace in the East aids in the development of a stable and democratic post-Cold War Europe. This Administration will ensure that the level of U.S. military presence is sufficient to respond to plausible crises, provide tangible evidence of America's commitment to preserving regional stability, and actively participate in multinational training, to minimize the likelihood of having to deploy additional forces from the continental United States in the early stages of a regional crisis. Such a force will also anchor both NATO's deterrent capability and the Alliance's ability to respond to out-of-area contingencies.
In the East Asian-Pacific region, the United States is in an unparalleled position to be a stabilizing force in the multipolar regional balance that has followed the Cold War. Because the United States is a powerful but distant state, its forward deployed forces are viewed by regional actors as a reassuring presence. Any significant diminution of the U.S. military presence in the East Asia-Pacific, absent a corresponding reduction in potential threats there, would risk creating the perception of a regional power vacuum. This, in turn, could touch off a regional arms race, threatening vital U.S. economic, political, and security interests.
Most U.S. forces in the East Asian-Pacific region are forward-stationed in Japan and Korea. These include an Army division consisting of two brigades and a fighter wing-equivalent of United States Air Force (USAF) combat aircraft on the Korean Peninsula; an Army Theater Area Command and Special Forces battalion, a Marine Expeditionary Force, an aircraft carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group, and one and a quarter fighter wing-equivalents of USAF combat aircraft in Japan. This force visibly demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the region, deters aggression by potentially hostile states, and allows for rapid and decisive U.S. action should deterrence fail.
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the Administration has undertaken a strategy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran for as long as these states pose a threat to U.S. interests, other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Since Operation Desert Storm, the United States has undertaken several specific steps to enhance its military presence in the region. Some of these steps include the continuous presence of an Army heavy battalion task force in Kuwait and a Patriot air defense artillery task force in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; prepositioning a heavy brigade set of equipment in Kuwait and a heavy battalion task force in Qatar; prepositioning a heavy brigade set afloat on ships in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; deployment of land-based aircraft in the Gulf region for Operation Southern Watch; increased naval presence (including a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group); and combined exercises conducted with the militaries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and other coalition partners.
These measures, combined with programs such as the squadron of Maritime Prepositioning Ships located in the Indian Ocean, give U.S. forces the ability to respond quickly to crisis in the region. The close military-to-military relationships built up over many years with each of the GCC states contribute to an environment that allows host countries to more readily and effectively support U.S. crisis deployment. DoD will continue to build on this solid base of cooperation by prepositioning equipment for a second heavy brigade and a division base in Qatar (equipment to support a tank battalion was put in place in 1996), maintaining the number of land-based combat and support aircraft deployed to the region, prepositioning additional stocks of preferred munitions in-theater, stationing mine countermeasures ships in the Persian Gulf, and further enhancing its program of training and exercises with U.S. security partners in the region.
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are extensive and varied, and a strong U.S. defense capability is essential to the region's security. For example, the United States' trade with Latin America is growing faster than trade with any other region. The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) provide crisis reaction forces, serve as partners in cooperative regional security, and symbolize the U.S. commitment to regional security. On June 1, 1997, USSOUTHCOM will assume responsibility for the Caribbean, and its included islands, to allow one command to more effectively deal with the region. Potential missions for U.S. forces in the region include support to counterdrug operations, counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, smaller-scale combat operations, and disaster relief. U.S. forces also continue to exercise and explore ways to encourage the free flow of information with regional friends and allies, helping to build cooperative security mechanisms and encouraging Latin American militaries to support civilian control, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.
The United States will continue to operate bases and facilities in the Republic of Panama until December 31, 1999, and is fully committed to implementing the Panama Canal Treaty. The two governments agreed to hold exploratory talks to discuss possible stationing of some U.S. forces in Panama beyond December 31, 1999, in order to promote stability and improve the coordination, cooperation, and synchronization of counterdrug activities in the region. The U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has proven valuable in handling migrants from Haiti and Cuba.
U.S. security and economic interests in Africa are not as prominent as those in other regions, and the United States has no bases in Africa. Yet in recent years, U.S. forces have been called upon to serve in large-scale peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Somalia and Rwanda and to evacuate U.S. citizens from Liberia and the Central African Republic. With the continuing possibility of conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Africa, it is important that the United States helps African states, particularly the new South Africa, develop more effective capabilities for conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The final set of operations for which DoD must shape its nonnuclear forces involves a variety of contingencies that are less demanding than major regional conflicts but still require significant combat forces and capabilities. Such operations range from smaller-scale combat operations and multilateral peace operations to counterterrorism activities and humanitarian assistance operations.
In some cases, the United States will advance its interests by providing military forces to selected allied/coalition operations, some of which may support United Nations Security Council resolutions. Further, the United States will continue to participate directly in UN peace operations when it serves U.S. interests. However, the United States will maintain the capability to act unilaterally when important U.S. interests are at stake.
Over the past decade, the United States has conducted an array of major contingency operations of the following types: peace operations, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, maritime escort, counterterrorism, reprisals, deterrence of aggression, intervention to support democracy, sanctions enforcement, no-fly zone enforcement, migrant rescue and support, search and rescue, and deployments to quell domestic civil disturbances.
In 1996, such contingency operations included crisis response in the Persian Gulf and Taiwan Straits; humanitarian relief and peace operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia; enforcement of the no-fly zone over southern Iraq; humanitarian relief in northern Iraq; and noncombatant evacuations from Liberia and the Central African Republic.
The forces for these operations are provided largely by the same conventional and special operations forces needed for major regional conflicts and overseas presence, although some specialized training and capabilities may be required. This means that the United States will not be able to conduct sizable contingency operations at the same time it is fighting in two major regional conflicts.
OVERALL FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
In the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, DoD determined that the force structure shown below, which will be reached by the end of the decade, can carry out America's strategy and meet its national security requirements.
If a major regional conflict erupts, the United States will deploy a substantial number of forces to the theater to augment those already there in order to quickly defeat the aggressor. If it is prudent to do so, limited U.S. forces may remain engaged in a smaller-scale operation, such as a peacekeeping operation, while the major regional conflict is ongoing; if not, U.S. forces will be withdrawn from contingency operations in order to help constitute sufficient forces to deter and, if necessary, fight and win a second major regional conflict. If a second major regional conflict were to break out shortly after the first, U.S. forces would deploy rapidly to halt the invading force as quickly as possible. Selected high-leverage and mobile intelligence, command and control, and air capabilities, as well as amphibious forces, would be redeployed from the first major regional conflict to the second as circumstances permitted. After winning both major regional conflicts, U.S. forces would assume a more routine peacetime posture. As mentioned earlier, this force structure is not intended to support simultaneous U.S. involvement in two major regional conflicts as well as sustained active force involvement in sizable contingency operations.
| Table
1 |
|||
| Cold War (FY 1990) |
FY 1998 | Force Target End FY 1999 |
|
| Military Personnel Active Selected Reserve |
2,069,000 1,128,000 |
1,431,000 892,000 |
1,422,000 889,000 |
| Army Divisions (Active/National Guard) |
18/10 |
10/8a |
10/8a |
| Air Force Fighter Wings (Active/Reserve) Bombers |
24/12 364 |
13/7 182 |
13/7 184 |
| Navy Aircraft Carriers (Active/Training) Air Wings (Active/Reserve) Attack Submarines Total Battle Force Ships |
15/1
13/2 |
11/1
10/1 |
11/1
10/1 |
| Marine Corps Divisions (Active/Reserve) Wings (Active/Reserve) |
3/1 3/1 |
3/1 3/1 |
3/1 3/1 |
| a Plus 15 enhanced brigades. | |||
SIZING U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES
Early START II ratification and implementation remains a primary U.S. objective.
When START II is ratified by the Russian Duma and the treaty enters into
force, the United States will draw down to and maintain:
The Peacekeeper missile will be retired. As the President made clear during the Moscow summit in May 1994, when START II enters into force, the United States will be prepared to take the lead to discuss further reductions. While the United States is prepared to carry out the reductions under the START II timetable, at the same time, the United States must have the capability to maintain the levels prescribed under START I. After START II enters into force and during the drawdown period, the United States will maintain that capability as a hedge in case of a reversal in these arms agreements. DoD has termed this a lead and hedge strategy -- providing leadership for continuing reductions in nuclear weapons and the benefit of the savings that would be achieved thereby, while hedging against the reversal of reform in Russia.
However, given the events of the past two years, the United States must also
prepare for the prospects that Russia may delay further the ratification
of the START II Treaty in spite of the climate of cooperation that exists
today. Until START II is ratified and enters into force, the United States
strategic force structure will be based on the levels agreed in the START
I Treaty, which is currently in force:
Consistent with this objective, funding decisions will be made to maintain the option to retain this force. The United States will also maintain its Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF), consisting of dual capable fighter bombers and submarine launched cruise missiles, available for worldwide deployment.
CONCLUSION
In the post-Cold War era, the United States plays the leading role in organizing coalitions of like-minded states to defend and advance common interests, to promote common values and norms, and thus, to create a world in which Americans can be secure and prosper. The force structure outlined above supports this strategy of engagement and enlargement. Together, these first-rate military forces underwrite security partnerships, help shape the international environment by their presence and activities, and deter and defeat aggression in a variety of settings.
