STRATFOR.com : Russia Likely To Respond To Chechen Crisis With Half-Measures

Russia Likely To Respond To Chechen Crisis With Half-Measures
28 October 2002

Summary

Following the recent takeover of a Moscow theater by Chechen militants, the Kremlin is likely to opt for more offensive battles in Chechnya, including possible cross-border attacks. But without a serious crackdown on the Chechen criminal network in Russia, such an offensive will not significantly improve Russian security.

Analysis

Following the violent end to the hostage-taking crisis in Moscow last week, the Kremlin is facing a tough challenge about what to do regarding its 3-year-old war with Chechen militants, who both Moscow and Washington now believe enjoy support of foreign Islamist groups including al Qaeda.

A continued war in Chechnya and possible new attacks on civilians in Russia could threaten both the current pro-Western regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the country's integrity as a whole. For the government, the most ideal option -- though not necessarily in terms of human rights -- would be a combination of major military strikes in Chechnya, the introduction of martial law in the region and the expulsion of all Chechens from Russia into Chechnya and abroad.

Although likely brutal, this would guarantee a much higher level of security for Russian citizens and foreigners outside Chechnya, and it could help Moscow's chances of winning the war. Chechen militants expelled from Russia would find it hard to penetrate more strictly controlled borders and commit attacks on civilians, such as the recent hostage-taking. Thus, martial law or emergency rule would drastically limit the ability of Chechen militants to conduct the war.

Another solution could be a combination of major military strikes in Chechnya, a declaration of martial law and a massive crackdown on Chechen organized crime and shadow businesses elsewhere. This option would help Moscow reduce international outcry following an expulsion of Chechens.

Though the West still might see a tough crackdown on alleged Chechen mafia members as a human rights violation, Moscow would have to choose between this disapproval and the fate of its security and integrity. Thousands of Chechen criminal organizations control tens of thousands of Russian state and private businesses, including some major firms in energy and other strategic industry sectors, Russian law enforcement agencies report.

Such a network amounts to a militant fifth column in Russia, making rebel attacks such as the recent hostage-taking in Moscow more effective. For example, it is already established that some Chechen "businesses" have a few cafes in the basement of the theater where the hostages were taken, and that much of the explosives the rebels used had accumulated in those cafes for several days undetected.

For the Kremlin, yet another option could be an intensification of the Russian army's current operations in Chechnya -- with no major strikes and without martial law -- along with an attempt to crack down on the fifth column that falls short of taking on the Chechen mafia.

A fourth option could be increased rhetoric against Chechen Islamists and stepped-up operations on the ground. In short, this option would imply the continuation of the war as it is being conducted now.

For instance, reports that the Russian army was launching a large-scale operation against Chechen fighters on Oct. 26 turned out to be untrue, according to Stratfor sources on the ground. Since the beginning of the hostage-taking drama, the pace of operations in Chechnya has not wavered. Russian special forces killed several militants, while the latter killed several Russians and detonated a mine, causing an oil train to derail.

The only noteworthy development on the ground is that Russian troops encircled four refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetia -- which contain not only civilians but also hundreds of Chechen fighters -- but have not installed checkpoints around the areas. Putin previously ordered that such camps remain untouched because he feared international outcry. Now Moscow apparently is trying to deal with the problem.

The final option -- one that an influential segment of the Russian elite, including pro-Westerners, are demanding -- is that the Kremlin end the war in Chechnya and start talks with Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov. But Putin will not take this route, no matter how pro-Western he is: It would be almost politically impossible after the hostage crisis and would put his power over Russia in danger. Ordinary Russians would not forgive him for capitulating.

What then is Putin likely to choose? On Oct. 28, he instructed the Russian General Staff to "bring about the changes in the plans of deployment of the armed forces," while warning that if militants try to seek or use weapons of mass destruction, Russia would take all necessary measures in all places where "the terrorists, the organizers of their crimes, and their ideological and financial inspirators are located," ITAR-Tass reported.

This is, in effect, a declaration of Putin's intention to conduct cross-border attacks on militants and their foreign backers far beyond Russian borders. Putin implies that he wants to follow the tactics that the United States and Israel, his new allies, long have used against Islamic militants across the globe.

The first obvious target could be rebel bases in Georgia, which Moscow claims have been used for years by Chechen and international militants for attacks on Russia and as a rear base. In the future, such a campaign could prove useful for the United States if some Russian special forces and air force personnel were to use the bases to strike al Qaeda-associated targets in the Middle East. This would help Washington reduce possible losses in its global anti-terrorism campaign, but it is unlikely to be used in the planned U.S. attack on Iraq because Russia says there is no link between Iraq and Islamic militants.

However, cross-border attacks would not eliminate the need for major strikes in Chechnya. In order for these to be effective, Putin would have to agree to introduce at least emergency wartime rules for Chechnya and combine major military strikes there with a crackdown on militants in Russia, and especially in Moscow. But this would not be effective unless Putin hit back at the Chechen mafia, which he is unlikely to do for two reasons.

First, too many Russian government officials and business leaders who support Putin have ties to Chechen organized crime, and they likely would sabotage any anti-mafia campaign. Second, Putin would fear Western criticism, since the liberal factions of the Russian and Western media likely would portray such a campaign as an attack on all Chechens.

This may leave Putin seeking an intensification of current Russian army operations in Chechnya without declaring martial law, and an attempted crackdown on the militants' fifth column without taking on the Chechen mafia. It does not appear that Putin can or is willing to proceed beyond this option.

He wants to accommodate all sides, both in Russia and in the West. He would not withdraw troops in Chechnya but, due to fears of a backlash, he would not take measures that would significantly increase Russia's chances to win this war either. Putin's hope likely lies in the fact that there currently is no well-organized and powerful opposition to him in Russia. He may hope that some offensive launched in Chechnya, along with cross-border operations, will defue the anger among Russians who believe their government is unable to protect them.

But he still might miscalculate, because the dissatisfaction with Putin's half-measures increasingly affects the Russian army and other power structures, including some active-duty generals, according to various Stratfor sources. But Putin's power will not be threatened in the near future, nor will he be forced to conduct a stronger U.S.-style war against the militants due to the lack of political opposition.